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THE  FIRST  AMENDMENT  WALKS  INTO  A  BAR:
TRADEMARK  REGISTRATION
AND FREE SPEECH
Rebecca Tushnet*
INTRODUCTION
Section 2 of the Lanham Act, the federal law governing trademarks, lists
a number of bars that preclude registration of a trademark on the federal
register.1  These reasons include: the claimed matter is functional, meaning
it affects the cost or quality of the underlying product or service; the claimed
matter is merely descriptive, meaning that consumers don’t understand that
it indicates source and instead think that it just describes some characteristic
of the product; the claimed matter is deceptively misdescriptive, which is like
descriptiveness except not true; the claimed matter is deceptive, meaning
that the untruth would be material to consumers; the claimed matter is con-
fusingly similar to an existing registered mark or mark in use in the United
States; the claimed matter is the name, photo, or signature of a living person
and there’s no written consent from that person to register the mark; the
claimed matter is the flag or insignia of a nation or state or other U.S. politi-
cal subdivision; the claimed matter creates a false association with people or
institutions; the claimed matter is a geographic indication for wine or spirits
but identifies a place other than the origin of the goods; and, last but not
least, the claimed matter is scandalous, immoral, or disparaging.
The constitutionality of section 2 is now in doubt.  Washington’s football
team had its disparaging marks cancelled, a decision upheld by a district
court in mid-2015 and now on appeal to the Fourth Circuit.2  But in Decem-
© 2016 Rebecca Tushnet.  Individuals and nonprofit institutions may reproduce and
distribute copies of this Article in any format at or below cost, for educational purposes, so
long as each copy identifies the author, provides a citation to the Notre Dame Law Review,
and includes this provision in the copyright notice.
* Professor of Law, Georgetown.  Thanks to Enrique Armijo, Jack Balkin, Deven
Desai, James Grimmelmann, Mark Lemley, Glynn Lunney, Lisa Ramsey, Fred Schauer,
Mike Seidman, Jessica Silbey, Mark Tushnet, participants at the Harvard Faculty Workshop,
the Free Expression Scholars Conference at Yale, William & Mary’s Student Intellectual
Property Symposium, and the American University-Washington College of Law’s
Trademark Works in Progress event.
1 Lanham Act § 2, 15 U.S.C. § 1052 (2012).
2 Pro-Football, Inc. v. Blackhorse, 112 F. Supp. 3d 439 (E.D. Va. 2015).  In this Article,
I have chosen to use the name of Washington’s professional football team only where
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ber 2015, the Federal Circuit, en banc, held that section 2(a)’s disparage-
ment bar was unconstitutional in the case of Simon Tam, an Asian-American
seeking to register an anti-Asian slur in order to reclaim its negative mean-
ing.3  The government apparently agrees that this holding also invalidates
section 2(a)’s scandalousness bar,4 and the Supreme Court granted certiorari
to review the decision in September 2016.
The Federal Circuit’s In re Tam decision drew on significant develop-
ments in First Amendment doctrine.  For example, earlier in 2015, in Reed v.
Town of Gilbert,5 the Supreme Court struck down a city’s sign regulations on
the theory that they were content-based and didn’t survive strict scrutiny.
The rule suggested by Reed is that all state regulations of speech that depend
on an evaluation of the content of the speech to determine whether the regu-
lation has been violated are content-based and must survive strict scrutiny.
Section 2 is almost nothing but content-based.
This Article analyzes the First Amendment arguments against sec-
tion 2(a)’s disparagement bar with reference to the consequences of any
invalidation on the rest of the trademark statute.  My fundamental conclu-
sions are that In re Tam is wrongly reasoned even given the Supreme Court’s
increased scrutiny of commercial speech regulations, and that to hold other-
wise and preserve the rest of trademark law would require unprincipled dis-
tinctions within trademark law.  More generally, the Supreme Court’s First
Amendment jurisprudence has become so expansive as to threaten basic
aspects of the regulatory state; the result of subjecting economic regulations
such as trademark registration to strict First Amendment scrutiny shows the
damage that can be done thereby.
I will first discuss the difficulty of applying the First Amendment to trade-
mark law, which grants one private entity the right to suppress others’ com-
mercial speech, but also facilitates commercial transactions.  Then, assuming
that the First Amendment will apply in some ways, I discuss trademark regis-
tration as a kind of government endorsement, as well as other arguments that
have evolved to justify the disparagement bar.  I conclude that section 2 is
others use it in quotes or titles, or as a reference to non-human objects such as potatoes; I
have used the name of Simon Tam’s band because I accept his intent to reclaim the term.
The Notre Dame Law Review makes every effort to avoid printing obscenities and racial slurs
unless, as in some instances in this Article, they are essential to the integrity of the piece.
The judgment calls about what words have to be evoked by asterisks and context indicate
the implementation difficulties of policing “scandalous” and “disparaging” marks, but, as I
will argue below, difficulty is not itself constitutional invalidity.
3 In re Tam, 808 F.3d 1321 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (en banc), cert. granted sub nom. Lee v.
Tam, 2016 WL 1587871 (U.S. Sept. 29, 2016) (No. 15-1293).
4 Beth A. Seals, Further Erosion to Section 2(a) of the Lanham Act—What’s Left?, LEXOLOGY
(Jan. 27, 2016), http://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=6bd23dd3-0c57-4cd9-a3
7b-a0208892dbe4 (discussing a Department of Justice letter brief stating that “the reason-
ing of Tam requires the invalidation of Section 2(a)’s prohibition against registering scan-
dalous and immoral marks as well . . . .” (quoting Letter Brief of U.S. Dep’t. of Justice at 2,
In re Brunetti, No. 2015-1109 (Fed. Cir. filed Jan. 21, 2016), http://src.bna.com/cd6)).
5 135 S. Ct. 2218, 2224 (2015).
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generally constitutional as a government determination about what speech it
is willing to enforce as a trademark.6  I then specifically turn to the unconsti-
tutional conditions doctrine as a useful lens through which to view the prob-
lem.  Unconstitutional conditions cases suggest that the government can ask
private entities for some speech-related things in exchange for discretionary
benefits, but not for others; I conclude that the disparagement bar is not an
unconstitutional condition on registration, because registration—unlike
other programs that have raised unconstitutional conditions questions—is
speech-based all the way down.
However, for those who disagree, I then argue that disparagement can’t
coherently be distinguished from a number of the other bars to registration
once the harsh logic of the First Amendment applies.  If trademark registra-
tion as a whole is constitutionally vulnerable under a particular vision of the
First Amendment, that very result counsels against adopting that vision as
constitutional doctrine.  Then, I defend registration as a government pro-
gram inherently shaping the speech environment against some further objec-
tions drawing on analogies to other regulations, primarily copyright.
I conclude by explaining how all of this work of distinguishing and
defending ordinary trademark registration—an activity that happens over
one hundred thousand times per year—is a consequence of misguided appli-
cation of tough First Amendment scrutiny to the modern regulatory state.
Many people think the government has no business rejecting trademark
registration because the claimed mark is disparaging.  That may be good pol-
icy.  But if the Supreme Court strikes down the disparagement bar, it will face
a difficult job distinguishing other aspects of trademark law.  And these diffi-
culties signal a greater problem: the Court has lost touch with the reasons
6 Numerous scholarly articles argue that section 2(a)’s disparagement bar is unconsti-
tutional. See, e.g., Theodore H. Davis, Jr., Registration of Scandalous, Immoral, and Disparaging
Matter Under Section 2(a) of the Lanham Act: Can One Man’s Vulgarity be Another’s Registered
Trademark?, 83 TRADEMARK REP. 801, 862 (1993); Llewellyn Joseph Gibbons, Semiotics of the
Scandalous and the Immoral and the Disparaging: Section 2(A) Trademark Law after Lawrence v.
Texas, 9 MARQ. INTELL. PROP. L. REV. 187, 235–36 (2005); Michelle B. Lee, Section 2(a) of the
Lanham Act as a Restriction on Sports Team Names: Has Political Correctness Gone Too Far?, 4
SPORTS LAW. J. 65, 71–74 (1997); Kimberly A. Pace, The Washington Redskins Case and the
Doctrine of Disparagement: How Politically Correct Must a Trademark Be?, 22 PEPP. L. REV. 7
(1994); Ron Phillips, A Case for Scandal and Immorality: Proposing Thin Protection of Controver-
sial Trademarks, 17 U. BALT. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 55, 68 (2008); Kristian D. Stout, Terrifying
Trademarks and a Scandalous Disregard for the First Amendment: Section 2(a)’s Unconstitutional
Prohibition on Scandalous, Immoral, and Disparaging Trademarks, 25 ALB. L.J. SCI. & TECH. 213
(2015); Jeffrey Lefstin, Note, Does the First Amendment Bar Cancellation of REDSKINS?, 52
STAN. L. REV. 665 (2000); Jendi B. Reiter, Note, Redskins and Scarlet Letters: Why “Immoral”
and “Scandalous” Trademarks Should Be Federally Registrable, 6 FED. CIR. B.J. 191, 197 (1996);
John V. Tait, Note, Trademark Regulations and the Commercial Speech Doctrine: Focusing on the
Regulatory Objective to Classify Speech for First Amendment Analysis, 67 FORDHAM L. REV. 897,
899, 909, 915 (1998). But see Justin G. Blankenship, The Cancellation of Redskins as a Dispar-
aging Trademark: Is Federal Trademark Law an Appropriate Solution for Words That Offend?, 72
U. COLO. L. REV. 415, 443–44 (2001); Ned Snow, Free Speech and Disparaging Trademarks, 57
B.C. L. REV. (forthcoming 2016).
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that some content-based distinctions might deserve special scrutiny.  Often,
as the concurrences in Reed noted, perfectly sensible and by no means censo-
rious regulations that depend on identifying the semantic content of speech
would fall afoul of a real application of heightened scrutiny, to no worthwhile
end.
I. SHOULD THE FIRST AMENDMENT EVEN APPLY?
It’s possible to argue that trademark is a First Amendment-free zone,7 as
copyright basically is except for the internal restraints of the fact/expression
division and fair use.8  This argument has heretofore been made only in the
context of suppressing third parties’ speech at the behest of trademark own-
ers: trademark law creates property rights, and private property rights can be
enforced without involving the government in the suppression of speech.9
But one can imagine the same argument for registration: registration’s bene-
fits are also property rights, and the government doesn’t implicate the First
Amendment by creating property rights, or declining to create them.
In 1987, San Francisco Arts & Athletics, Inc. v. U.S. Olympic Committee10
(“SFAA”) upheld a law granting the United States Olympic Committee
authority to suppress any unauthorized commercial or noncommercial but
“promotional” uses of “Olympic” and related symbols, going beyond ordinary
7 Frederick Schauer has offered the classic statement of the distinction between First
Amendment coverage and First Amendment protection.  Frederick Schauer, Speech and
“Speech”—Obscenity and “Obscenity”: An Exercise in the Interpretation of Constitutional Language,
67 GEO. L.J. 899, 905 n.33 (1979) (“If an activity is covered by the first amendment, regula-
tion of that activity is evaluated in light of the heightened standard of review required by
the first amendment. . . . [I]f the state can put forth a justification that withstands strict
scrutiny, the activity is not protected even though it is covered.”); see also Frederick
Schauer, The Boundaries of the First Amendment: A Preliminary Exploration of Constitutional Sali-
ence, 117 HARV. L. REV. 1765 (2004); Frederick Schauer, Out of Range: On Patently Uncovered
Speech, 128 HARV. L. REV. FORUM 346 (2015).
8 Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 219–21 (2003) (holding that as long as Congress
does not go beyond the “traditional contours” of copyright—as long as it preserves fair use
and the idea/expression distinction—it has essentially complete freedom to legislate on
what is covered by copyright); see also Golan v. Holder, 132 S. Ct. 873, 890 (2012).
9 See, e.g., Dall. Cowboys Cheerleaders, Inc. v. Pussycat Cinema, Ltd., 604 F.2d 200,
206 (2d Cir. 1979) (finding that a pornographic movie had no right to “appropriate plain-
tiff’s trademark” to “convey a barely discernible message”; trademark was “in the nature of
a property right,” and “need not ‘yield to the exercise of First Amendment rights under
circumstances where adequate alternative avenues of communication exist’” (quoting
Lloyd Corp. v. Tanner, 407 U.S. 551, 567 (1972))); Interbank Card Ass’n v. Simms, 431 F.
Supp. 131, 133–34 (M.D.N.C. 1977) (explaining that enforcing trademark rights is like
enforcing property rights, and does not infringe on the First Amendment); Nat’l Bd. of
YWCA v. YWCA of Charleston, 335 F. Supp. 615, 625 (D.S.C. 1971) (“By granting to a
religious organization the exclusive use of a name, the Patent Office only deprives other
religious groups of the use of that particular name, and such grant does not deny such
other religious organizations the opportunity to establish competing groups having the
same purpose but with different names.”).
10 483 U.S. 522 (1987).
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trademark law.11 SFAA was wrong when decided—among other things, it
implausibly characterized a law governing specified symbols as content-neu-
tral12—and its acceptance of suppressing noncommercial, non-deceptive
speech without any showing of harm is even more dubious today, after United
States v. Alvarez13 found that lies can’t be constitutionally punished in the
absence of some kind of harm.14  Nonetheless, the rationale that the U.S.
Olympic Committee deserved a “limited” property right clearly had persua-
sive force to the Court, and the Alvarez Court did not reject SFAA.15
The last notable Lanham Act case to follow the property-loophole rea-
soning was also in 1987.16  The continuing expansion of trademark liability
to movies, art, and newspaper polls started to worry the courts of appeal,
leading most of them to adopt a highly speech-protective standard, at least as
applied to uses of trademarks in noncommercial speech (that is, in books,
movies, and other non-advertising speech).17 SFAA did nothing to slow this
shift, and understandably so.  If government has a completely free hand to
11 Amateur Sports Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-606, § 110, 92 Stat. 3048 (granting rights
against “any person who uses [specified Olympic symbols] for the purpose of trade, to
induce the sale of any goods or services, or to promote any theatrical exhibition, athletic
performance, or competition”).  There are similar special statutory protections for other
icons such as Smokey the Bear, the Red Cross, the Boy Scouts, and the Girl Scouts. See, e.g.,
18 U.S.C. § 705 (2012) (veterans’ organizations); id. § 706 (American National Red Cross);
id. § 707 (4–H Club); id. § 711 (“Smokey Bear”); id. § 711a (“Woodsy Owl”); Pub. L. No.
105-225, 112 Stat. 1360, 1362 (1998) (Girl Scouts); Pub. L. No. 94-443, 90 Stat. 1475 (1976)
(Daughters of the American Revolution); Pub. L. No. 88-378, 78 Stat. 325, 328 (1964)
(Little League Baseball); Pub. L. No. 74-373, 49 Stat. 457, 458 (1935) (American National
Theater and Academy); Pub. L. No. 64-148, 39 Stat. 227 (1916) (Boy Scouts).
12 SFAA, 483 U.S. at 536–37.  The Court also suggested that the test for regulation of
truthful commercial speech was the same as the O’Brien test, and that the law at issue
passed Central Hudson scrutiny. See id. at 537 n.16.
13 132 S. Ct. 2537, 2551 (2012).
14 The SFAA Court reasoned that Congress could make a wholesale determination
that any commercial or promotional use of the Olympic marks was likely to cause confu-
sion or to dilute the value of the trademark. See SFAA, 483 U.S. at 539 (“Congress reasona-
bly could conclude that most commercial uses of the Olympic words and symbols are likely
to be confusing.  It also could determine that unauthorized uses, even if not confusing,
nevertheless may harm the USOC by lessening the distinctiveness and thus the commercial
value of the marks.”).  However, Congress lacked an evidentiary basis for such fact finding,
even though a blanket approach might be appropriate in other circumstances.
15 See Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. at 2554–56 (Breyer, J., concurring) (citing SFAA favorably); see
also id. at 2559 (Alito, J., dissenting).
16 Mut. of Omaha Ins. Co. v. Novak, 836 F.2d 397, 402 (8th Cir. 1987).
17 Rogers v. Grimaldi, 875 F.2d 994, 999 (2d Cir. 1989) (rejecting the “no alternative
avenues” approach as applied to trademark because it was insufficiently protective of
speech rights, and explaining that it “cannot indulge the facile assumption that one can
forbid particular words without running a substantial risk of suppressing ideas in the pro-
cess” (quoting Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 26 (1971) (internal quotation marks omit-
ted) (appears in original as, “cannot indulge the facile assumption that one can forbid
particular words without also running a substantial risk of suppressing ideas in the
process”)).
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create property rights to trump the First Amendment, after all, then all it
would need to do to overturn New York Times v. Sullivan is define a person’s
good reputation as her property.18  In fact, if avoiding the First Amendment
were that simple, a state could simply provide Native Americans property
rights in their collective image, at which point they could prevent the Wash-
ington team from using disparaging—or any—references to them.19
Even apart from property reasoning, infringing uses may have been his-
torically unprotected because they were considered low-value, misleading
commercial speech integral to a commercial transaction.  However, denial of
trademark registration is not solely an issue of speech being unprotected
because it’s low-value.  Denying registration is a determination that the gov-
ernment chooses not to support the speech at issue (whether or not that
support is characterized as the creation of a property right).  A registration
may bar future registrations of similar marks; a trademark right allows its
owner to suppress other uses.  If denying the right to use a mark to other
parties isn’t a violation of a First Amendment right, why would denying trade-
mark protection to the claimant be a violation of a First Amendment right,
when both would be using it in the same way: to indicate the source of goods
or services?20  The reason has to lie in the government’s justification for its
action.  For stopping infringement, the justification is the prevention of con-
sumer deception, but, as we will see, the justifications for denying registration
are rather more complicated.21
Another constitutional jurisprudence could use the fact that a trade-
mark confers a private right to suppress other people’s speech as a reason
that the government can make balancing decisions about whom to favor.  If
the Washington team has trademark protection for its name, it can suppress
18 Cf. Deven R. Desai, Speech, Citizenry, and the Market: A Corporate Public Figure Doctrine,
98 MINN. L. REV. 455, 494–95 (2013) (discussing the phenomenon of speech suppression
through trademark dilution law).
19 Perhaps a takings problem would arise, as the Washington team has already claimed
with respect to the cancellation in progress.  But after the government paid for any taking,
the team’s claim should be extinguished.
20 See In re Tam, 808 F.3d 1321, 1378 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (Reyna, J., dissenting) (“But if
the expressive content of the mark precludes regulation, on what authority may the govern-
ment grant Mr. Tam the exclusive right to use this mark in commerce?  Whatever standard
of scrutiny protects the content of Mr. Tam’s trademark from government regulation, that
same standard must necessarily be overcome by the government’s substantial interest in
the orderly flow of commerce, or no trademark could issue.”).  Another Asian-American
musical group, or for that matter a racist group, could seek to make the same statement as
Mr. Tam, or its opposite, and they would have the same political speech interests, precisely
because the term is disparaging.
21 As I have explained elsewhere, anti-dilution laws should be recognized as unconsti-
tutional regulations of non-deceptive commercial speech. See Rebecca Tushnet, Gone in
Sixty Milliseconds: Trademark Law and Cognitive Science, 86 TEX. L. REV. 507 (2008); Rebecca
Tushnet, More than a Feeling: Emotion and the First Amendment, 127 HARV. L. REV. 2392
(2014); see also Robert C. Denicola, Trademarks as Speech: Constitutional Implications of the
Emerging Rationales for the Protection of Trade Symbols, 1982 WIS. L. REV. 158, 194–95 (conclud-
ing similarly).
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the speech of others that infringes on its government-created rights.  And yet
those others will have equal interests in using their names to make statements
about the world, or about themselves.22  For example, when one entity claims
a trademark right to exclude others from identifying themselves, or the com-
munities they serve, as “Mormon,” the free speech interests of the non-right-
sholders are profoundly implicated.23
Although the mere choice of a name might be characterized as purely
self-regarding and self-actualizing, the attempt to register a mark and claim
exclusive rights to its use cannot be so understood; it inherently limits what
other people can do.  Thus, while the denial of registration under section
2(a) appears to many to put the government’s thumb on the scale on a mat-
ter of public concern, the registration is also a thumb on the scale, as the
Washington team is proving constantly by claiming that the long-standing
nature of its registration is itself a justification for holding that its mark is
valid.  The justification for granting some private parties the rights to sup-
press others’ speech is that doing so helps create an orderly and efficient
market.  But we should recognize that this rationale inherently relies on the
government’s deep involvement in creating and structuring the market.  As I
will detail below, this involvement also justifies the government’s desire to
avoid implicating itself in disparagement and discrimination.
Whatever rule the government makes will affect the speech environ-
ment.  Once we recognize that fact, saying that each rule has to survive strict
scrutiny doesn’t make much sense.  Unfortunately, this is a tough argument
to make in our current constitutional order, which tends to assume the exis-
tence of particular baselines, such as that the government will not just protect
but register many trademarks.
II. PRIOR JUSTIFICATIONS FOR THE BAR ON REGISTERING DISPARAGING MARKS
While trademark registration has no exact analogies in current First
Amendment caselaw, it may be useful to think of registration as performing a
market-enhancing function, furthering Congress’s goal that commerce flow
freely and cleanly.  Allowing some registrations will contribute to a desirable
market structure, while denying other, overreaching applications for registra-
tion will also contribute to that structure.  Once we know what the govern-
ment’s goals are, we should ask whether there is a rational relationship
between the registration system and the kind of market the government
22 See, e.g., Parks v. LaFace Records, 329 F.3d 437, 449 (6th Cir. 2003) (“[U]nmodified
application of the likelihood of confusion factors in trademark cases [ ] gives no weight to
First Amendment concerns.  Instead, it treats the name of an artistic work as if it were no
different from the name of an ordinary commercial product. . . . The names artists bestow
on their art can be part and parcel of the artistic message. . . . If Parks possesses a right to
police the use of her name, even when that right can be exercised only to prevent con-
sumer confusion, she has the means to restrict the public discourse to some extent.” (cita-
tions omitted)).
23 See Vera Ranieri, Not Mormon® , But Still Mormon, EFF DEEPLINKS (Feb. 9, 2016),
https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2016/02/not-mormonr-still-mormon.
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wants to create.  There must be an allocation of economic power some-
where—whether that is done by creating a limited monopoly on a mark or by
denying it—and the government’s choice among those options should sim-
ply be reasonable, at least with respect to the regulation of commercial
speech.
What, then, should the government’s ideal of the market be?  One view
of the relationship between commerce and society can be described as
“doux-commerce”: commercial relations improve overall human relations
because market transactions encourage trust, interdependence, and atten-
tiveness to others’ needs.24  Consistent with this vision, trademark registra-
tion promotes a market economy in which people are open to interactions
with institutions identified by trademarks rather than by specific personali-
ties, and in which goods and services are available on a more or less equal
basis to all who can pay for them.  Within this structure, section 2(a) contrib-
utes to making the market open towards all potential participants by denying
government support to discrimination.25
The disparagement bar also, as Michael Grynberg has argued, serves to
exclude from registration words that are so full of meaning already that their
ability to function as indications of origin—the basic duty of a trademark—is
sharply limited, at least for the group targeted by a disparaging term.26  The
disparagement bar thus is part of a system that overall encourages producers
to choose “empty vessels”—trademarks that allow consumers to search for
brand information without distractions triggered by the disparaging meaning
of a term. These disparagement-based distractions are equivalent to the “ster-
eotype threat” that impairs performance on tests when members of histori-
cally low-performing groups are reminded of their membership in a relevant
group.  Although a disparaging term is protected as expression by the First
Amendment, as a commercial identifier it is poorly suited to doing a trade-
mark’s job.
24 ALBERT O. HIRSCHMAN, THE PASSIONS AND THE INTERESTS: POLITICAL ARGUMENTS FOR
CAPITALISM BEFORE ITS TRIUMPH 56–63 (1977) (providing historical background for the
“douceur of commerce”); Albert O. Hirschman, Rival Interpretations of Market Society: Civiliz-
ing, Destructive, or Feeble?, 20 J. ECON. LIT. 1463, 1465–66 (1982) (summarizing the claim
that a market economy would encourage people to be “more honest, reliable, orderly, and
disciplined, as well as more friendly and helpful, ever ready to find solutions to conflicts
and a middle ground for opposed opinions”); Carol Rose, The Comedy of the Commons: Cus-
tom, Commerce, and Inherently Public Property, 53 U. CHI. L. REV. 711, 775–76 (1986) (discuss-
ing the idea that commerce can promote sociability and decrease conflict, including by
encouraging traders to sympathize with strangers).
25 One argument that opponents of the disparagement bar often make is that the
market will take care of truly offensive marks.  Consumers will refuse to buy, and the offen-
sive seller will go out of business.  But that argument does not deal with disparaging marks
that target only subsets of the population; a market can segment so that racists, or even
people who just do not care about harm to the target group, can support the trademark
owner.  Such segmentation, while possible, works against the government’s interest in a
broad, open market.
26 Michael Grynberg, A Trademark Defense of the Disparagement Bar, 126 YALE L.J. FORUM
178 (2016).
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With this background, I turn to the debate over the constitutionality of
the disparagement bar.  When the disparagement bar has been challenged
on First Amendment grounds, pre-Tam courts and the PTO have offered
three responses: first, the bar avoids the harm done by the government
endorsement represented by a registration; second, the bar implements a
decision to withhold government resources from disparaging or scandalous
terms; and third, the bar is acceptable because of the lack of any effect on a
user’s ability or right to use the mark.
A. Government Endorsement
The first justification, that registration is a form of endorsement, seems
to depend on public understanding of the meaning of registration.  Last
Term, Walker v. Texas Division, Sons of Confederate Veterans, Inc.27 allowed a
state government to refuse to approve a Confederate Veterans logo for per-
sonalized license plates even though it approved a large number of other
specialized license plates.  The Court ruled that the plate design constituted
governmental speech, and thus the government was not bound to neutrality
in its decisions.28
If registration is the government’s agreement that a term is appropriate
for federal registration, equivalent to the government’s agreement that a
term is appropriate for placement on a license plate, then there is no prob-
lem with refusing the registration.  This is the reasoning recently adopted by
the district judge deciding the Washington football team’s case.  By contrast,
the Tam majority in the Federal Circuit disagreed, concluding that trade-
mark registration didn’t signal a government imprimatur to the general pub-
lic.29  To the best of my knowledge, however, there is no systematic empirical
evidence about what the public thinks of registration.30
Many of the factors cited by the Supreme Court in Confederate Veterans
have analogues in trademark registration.  There is a long history of govern-
ment registration of trademarks after extensive substantive examination, like
the long history of governmental approval of license plates on substantive
grounds.31  Moreover, the PTO maintains or cancels the registration depend-
27 135 S. Ct. 2239 (2015).
28 Id. at 2246–50.  Along with public understanding, the Court pointed to the govern-
ment’s degree of control over what went on license plates to justify its conclusion.  Of
course, that rationale poses serious risks of circularity unless bolstered by some other
factor.
29 In re Tam, 808 F.3d 1321, 1345–47 (Fed. Cir. 2015).
30 Anecdotally, some lawyers don’t perceive registration as endorsement, while others
do, with no overwhelming pattern. See Should Trademarks And License Plates Be Treated The
Same?, LAW360 (July 17, 2015), http://www.law360.com/articles/679616/should-trade-
marks-and-license-plates-be-treated-the-same (explaining that of the twenty lawyers who
opined, eleven concluded that registration didn’t reflect government endorsement, eight
said it did or constituted a limited public forum, and one had no real conclusion.).
31 Confederate Veterans, 135 S. Ct. at 2248. Cf. McBride v. Motor Vehicle Div. of Utah
State Tax Comm’n, 977 P.2d 467, 470 (Utah 1999) (holding that REDSKINS plate should
be recalled if offensive to a reasonable person); John Heilprin, Utah Republican Is Liberal
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ing on subsequent events, similar to Texas’s continuing control over specialty
plates.32  Like the Texas Department of Motor Vehicles Board, the PTO must
approve every proposed registration and dictates its scope, including any
required disclaimers of generic or descriptive components of the mark.33
Like entities seeking specialized message license plates instead of bumper
stickers conveying the same message, individuals choose registrations over
unregistered marks in order to get the benefits of federal recognition—
although, unlike the situation with license plates, many of those benefits are
administrative.34  As to license plates, the Court concluded that “[t]he fact
that private parties take part in the design and propagation of a message does
not extinguish [its] governmental nature.”35
Because disparagement in particular is about insulting the dignity of
individuals or groups, the endorsement argument also draws strength from
other cases in which avoiding governmental endorsement of private discrimi-
nation trumped otherwise strong interests.36  As Carol Rose explained in the
context of real property rights, when the government decides that something
is within the legitimate scope of a property right, such as enforcing a racially
restrictive covenant, it is involved in the resulting discrimination.37  Uphold-
ing a racially restrictive covenant as a property right requires a determination
that it’s at least reasonable to conclude that discrimination enhances prop-
erty values, giving effect to a “customary norm of racial disparagement.”38
The government’s willingness to accept this conclusion can itself be under-
With Apologies as U.S. Taxpayer Advocate, SALT LAKE TRIB., Mar. 14, 1999, at A1 (reporting
that, applying this standard, the relevant commission recalled the plate); Personal License
Plates Offend, SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIB., Mar. 10, 2000, at A1 (reporting that Washington
team fan was asked to surrender RDSKINS plate because of an American Indian’s
complaint).
32 See Confederate Veterans, 135 S. Ct. at 2248 (discussing how Texas issues the plates,
regulates their disposal, and owns the designs).
33 Id. at 2243.
34 Id. at 2249 (stating that individuals choose specialty plates over bumper stickers
because they hope to convey the impression that “the State has endorsed th[e] message”).
35 Id. at 2251; see also Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, 555 U.S. 460, 470–71 (2009).
The Tam majority reasoned that private trademarks aren’t “created by the government,
owned or monopolized by the government, sized and formatted by the government, imme-
diately understood as performing any government function (like unique, visible vehicle
identification), aligned with the government, or (putting aside any specific government-
secured trademarks) used as a platform for government speech.” In re Tam, 808 F.3d
1321, 1346 (Fed. Cir. 2015).  But those things, with the exception of sizing to fit on a
license plate, aren’t done by the government with respect to specialized plates either; it
isn’t the specialty logo that serves as “unique, visible” identification (to the contrary, the
point of specialty plates is to share an identity with others).
36 See, e.g., Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948).
37 Carol M. Rose, The Story of Shelley v. Kraemer, in PROPERTY STORIES 169, 196–97
(Gerald Korngold & Andrew P. Morriss eds., 2004).
38 Id. at 197.
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stood as discriminatory state action.39  The government endorsement of the
discriminatory behavior or slur then does harm over and above the private
action.40
The key question is then whether registration is, at least in part, the gov-
ernment speaking to endorse a mark.  Registration certificates clearly bear
the PTO’s imprimatur.  But do ordinary people understand the difference
between the ® symbol, the TM symbol, and nothing?  The Supreme Court
didn’t look for empirical evidence about audience perception in the Confeder-
ate Veterans case when it determined that license plates were government
speech.41  And given that at least some of the outrage expressed over the
football team’s name is that it has official government recognition as a regis-
tered mark, the registration may indeed be serving as a kind of government
imprimatur to some people.
There’s a related body of law of relevance: the Establishment Clause
cases, in which one test is whether government “endorses” religion with some
action.  Courts assess endorsement from an objective but not empirical per-
spective, assuming a person with reasonable levels of historical knowledge
39 Id.; see also Palmore v. Sidoti, 466 U.S. 429 (1984) (invalidating custody determina-
tion based on the harm to the child that would be caused by racist reaction to the child’s
being in the custody of an interracial couple). Cf. Lee v. Superior Court, 11 Cal. Rptr. 2d
763 (Cal. Ct. App. 1992) (allowing the change of a legal name to a racial epithet might be
state sanction of a racial epithet, contrary to Fourteenth Amendment prohibition on offi-
cial racial discrimination); Julia Shear Kushner, Comment, The Right to Control One’s Name,
57 UCLA L. REV. 313, 341–42 (2009) (noting states’ interest in preventing other citizens
from being forced to use an “inherently offensive” name).
40 There’s a related argument based on secondary effects, as in the nude dancing
cases. See Tam, 808 F.3d at 1378–79 (Reyna, J., dissenting) (first citing City of Erie v. Pap’s
A.M., 529 U.S. 277 (2000) (upholding a ban on fully nude dancing); then citing Barnes v.
Glen Theatre, 501 U.S. 560 (1991) (same)); see also Tam, 808 F.3d at 1380 (“Although the
Majority distinguishes between conduct and speech, the distinction is without a difference
in this context.  Whether a restaurant named ‘SPICS NOT WELCOME’ would actually
serve a Hispanic patron is hardly the point.  The mere use of the demeaning mark in
commerce communicates a discriminatory intent as harmful as the fruit produced by the
discriminatory conduct.” (citation omitted)).  Proponents of cancellation argue that seeing
stereotypes of Native Americans harms both Native Americans and non-Native Americans,
the latter of whom unconsciously learn that Native Americans are not real people but
historical artifacts, rendering attention to Native Americans’ interests in the present unnec-
essary. See C. RICHARD KING, REDSKINS: INSULT AND BRAND (2016); Terence Dougherty,
Note, Group Rights to Cultural Survival: Intellectual Property Rights in Native American Cultural
Symbols, 29 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 355 (1998).  While these types of harm arguments
generally fail with respect to most non-sexual speech regulations, they may have more
force if the question is whether the government can refrain from supporting private
discrimination.
41 See generally Walker v. Tex. Division, Sons of Confederate Veterans, Inc., 135 S. Ct.
2239 (2015); see also Williams-Yulee v. Fla. Bar, 135 S. Ct. 1656, 1667 (2015) (upholding a
regulation on judicial elections under strict scrutiny while noting that “[t]he concept of
public confidence in judicial integrity does not easily reduce to precise definition, nor does
it lend itself to proof by documentary record”).
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and understanding.42  If that reasonably informed observer is also the mea-
sure of understanding here, then the argument for treating registration as
government endorsement is much stronger.  As I’ve seen in discussing the
Washington football team’s mark with a number of reporters, it’s relatively
easy to grasp the difference between registration and trademark protection,
and it’s even easier to understand the difference between the broad right to
use a term and the much more limited ability to assert a trademark in it.43
Given that fact, by analogy section 2(a) is, if anything, an easier case than
Confederate Veterans.
The Confederate Veterans dissent argued that, given how many different
license plates are approved, no one could reasonably perceive a government
endorsement of each one.44  That’s even more true for trademark registra-
tions—the government couldn’t endorse both an Apple Mac and a Windows
PC, or be a fan of Texas A&M and of the UT Longhorns.  But that claim is an
oversimplification—the government could express an opinion about what the
boundaries of appropriate public discourse are, and it could accept both
Apple and Microsoft as contenders, just as it can approve a no-pets restrictive
covenant and an all-pets-allowed covenant for a residential community
because both are rational.  Allowing a particular plate, or a particular mark,
expresses only the opinion that it’s appropriate for its environment, without
saying that it’s correct.45
42 See, e.g., Capitol Square Review and Advisory Bd. v. Pinette, 515 U.S. 753, 780 (1995)
(O’Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) (stating that the rea-
sonable observer considers history and context in determining meaning of government
action); Cressman v. Thompson, 798 F.3d 938, 958 (10th Cir. 2015) (“As the contours of
the Establishment Clause’s reasonable-observer test have been sketched over the years, it
has become clear that this reasonable observer is not the everyday casual gawker.” (citing
Weinbaum v. City of Las Cruces, 541 F.3d 1017, 1031 n.16 (10th Cir. 2008))); Felix v. City
of Bloomfield, 36 F. Supp. 3d 1233, 1246–47 (D.N.M. 2014) (“The endorsement analysis is
objective; it requires the Court to assume the mindset of a reasonable observer who is
aware of the purpose, context, and history of the symbol.  Like the ‘reasonably prudent
person’ of tort law, this observer’s knowledge is not limited to ‘the information gleaned
simply from viewing the challenged display.’” (citations omitted) (quoting Weinbaum, 541
F.3d at 1031)); see also Spence v. Washington, 418 U.S. 405, 409–10 (1974) (per curiam)
(considering social and political context in determining whether an individual engaged in
symbolic speech).
43 Amanda Blackhorse, the named individual petitioner for cancellation of the Wash-
ington team’s mark, has said: “I know that the cancellation of the trademark does not
mean that the team has to change their name.  I think our biggest thing with this is that,
you know, their name, the ‘R’ word, does not deserve federal protection,” indicating that
she, at least, makes that distinction.  Amanda Blackhorse, Meet the Navajo Activist Who Got
the Washington Redskins’ Trademark Revoked: Amanda Blackhorse, DEMOCRACY NOW! (June 19,
2014), http://www.democracynow.org/2014/6/19/meet_the_navajo_activist_who_got.
44 Cf. Kushner, supra note 39, at 338–39 (relying on pre-Confederate Veterans precedent
to conclude that official name changes are not government speech because they do not
condone private individuals’ messages).
45 See In re Tam, 808 F.3d 1321, 1375–76 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (Lourie, J., dissenting)
(“Similarly to specialty license plate designs, federally registered trademarks can be identi-
fied with two message contexts: one from the provider of goods or services, who has chosen
\\jciprod01\productn\N\NDL\92-1\NDL108.txt unknown Seq: 13 30-NOV-16 11:26
2016] the  first  amendment  walks  into  a  bar 393
Another model that might make sense for registration, though again
there is no perfect analogy, is that of the nonpublic forum.  When the gov-
ernment makes a resource available to certain speakers, it sometimes can
limit those speakers to particular content, although it must remain viewpoint
neutral.46  One key feature of a nonpublic forum is that participants are gen-
erally selected through “individual, non-ministerial judgments” by the gov-
ernment.47  The substantive examination involved in trademark registration
qualifies as just such a detailed, individualized inquiry.48
Whether or not registration is “government speech,” then, the govern-
ment is involved enough in the trademark system to justify the disparage-
ment bar.
B. Government Resources
If the government endorsement argument fails, however, the next stan-
dard justification for refusing disparaging marks registration is persuasive.
The bar doesn’t save government resources, because it takes a lot of judicial
and administrative resources to enforce section 2(a).  Also, if section 43(a) of
the Lanham Act remains available to protect against confusing uses of unre-
gistered disparaging marks,49 then government resources are still being
devoted to protecting such marks.  Section 43(a) protection likely requires
even more judicial resources, insofar as there is no more presumption of
validity under section 43 as there is for a registered mark and therefore an
to use a certain mark to link its product or services to itself, and one from the government,
which has deemed the mark qualified for the federal registration program. . . .  [W]hile a
trademark alone, as a word placed on private property, is not government speech, once it
claims that federally registered status, it becomes more than the private owner’s speech.”).
46 See, e.g., Int’l Soc’y for Krishna Consciousness v. Lee, 505 U.S. 672, 679 (1992)
(explaining that in a nonpublic forum, where access standards are subject to the most
“limited review,” a “challenged regulation need only be reasonable, as long as the regula-
tion is not an effort to suppress the speaker’s activity due to disagreement with the
speaker’s view”); cf. Redmond v. Jockey Club, 244 Fed. App’x 663, 668 (6th Cir. 2007)
(holding that the horse naming registry didn’t violate First Amendment by refusing to
register horse under the name SALLY HEMINGS, even though benefits of participating in
certain races were available only upon registration, because bar on offensive names was
reasonable in light of the purpose of the registry).
47 Ark. Educ. Television Comm’n v. Forbes, 523 U.S. 666, 680 (1998); see also Corne-
lius v. NAACP Legal Def. & Educ. Fund, 473 U.S. 788, 806 (1985) (holding that a federal
charity drive was a nonpublic forum because each participant needed to be individually
approved).
48 Lilit Voskanyan, Comment, The Trademark Principal Register as a Nonpublic Forum, 75
U. CHI. L. REV. 1295, 1317–20 (2008) (concluding that, although the registration system is
inclusive, it is still individualized and not ministerial, and thus is a nonpublic forum). But
see id. at 1327 (concluding that disparagement is impermissibly viewpoint-based).
49 An assumption made by a number of the defenses of section 2(a), though not one
with which I agree.  I address this question in another paper.  Rebecca Tushnet, Registering
Disagreement: Registration in Modern American Trademark Law, 130 HARV. L. REV. (forthcom-
ing 2017).
\\jciprod01\productn\N\NDL\92-1\NDL108.txt unknown Seq: 14 30-NOV-16 11:26
394 notre dame law review [vol. 92:1
inquiry into protectability must be made in each case.50  The “resources”
argument is best understood as another version of the argument against gov-
ernment support of a disparaging term, and should either factor into the
endorsement analysis above or be rejected as insufficient on its own.
C. The Right to Use
The third justification for the disparagement bar, lack of effect on the
ability or right to use the mark, is the most complicated and also ultimately
the strongest.  This justification has two variants.  First, as noted above, it’s
possible that section 43(a) of the Lanham Act or state-law protection against
confusing uses of unregistered marks would exist despite the fact that a mark
is unregistrable because it’s disparaging.51  Second, even if there’s no section
43(a) protection against confusing uses by other people, there’s still nothing
stopping anyone, including the Washington football team, from using a dis-
paraging term on a T-shirt or uniform and thus there is no cognizable harm
inflicted on them.  Although the government can rarely suppress speech
based on its content, it also isn’t required to support or facilitate in amplify-
ing the reach of privately produced disparaging content.
Even if non-registration protection remains available, the first variant of
the “free to use” argument is unsatisfying.  There are significant differences
between the benefits of registered and unregistered marks, including nation-
wide scope, presumption of validity/incontestability after five years, the abil-
ity to use a U.S. registration to secure rights under foreign registration
systems, and the ability to invoke counterfeiting laws.52  If withholding those
benefits is acceptable because of the government’s involvement in enforcing
rights in a disparaging term, or because of the harm done by disparaging
terms, then it should also be acceptable to impose the further wall between
discriminatory speech and government support created by not providing any
50 Cf. LaTouraine Coffee Co. v. Lorraine Coffee Co., 157 F.2d 115, 125 n.26 (2d Cir.
1946) (Frank, J., dissenting) (“The underlying question in this and similar [trademark]
cases is precisely whether, considering the conflicting social interests, the plaintiff should
be accorded governmental aid through an order of a governmental agency, a court.  Only
if the government, through a court, grants that aid does the plaintiff have a ‘property
right.’  For convenience, that phrase may be used as a shorthand label for the fact that
plaintiff has received, or will receive, such assistance; it should not, however, be said or
thought that he is so aided because he has such a ‘right.’”).
51 Compare In re Tam, 808 F.3d 1321, 1344 n.11 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (stating that section
43(a) protections are unavailable to unregistrable marks), with Belmora LLC v. Bayer Con-
sumer Care AG, 819 F.3d 697, 706 (4th Cir. 2016) (“[T]he plain language of [section]
43(a) does not require that a plaintiff possess or have used a trademark in U.S. commerce
as an element of the cause of action.”).
52 Andrew Stockment, Trademarks 101 Part 2: The Benefits of Federal Registration, A.B.A.:
YOUNG LAW. DIV., (last visited Sept. 23, 2016) http://www.americanbar.org/groups/young
_lawyers/publications/the_101_201_practice_series/trademarks_101_part_2_the_bene
fits_of_federal_registration.html.
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private right to suppress others’ confusing uses at all.53  We should treat sec-
tion 2(a) the same whether or not we believe that common-law protection or
section 43(a) remains available for a disparaging mark.
The continued freedom to use a term whose registration is denied, how-
ever, does bear on the appropriate First Amendment analysis.  The registra-
tion bars can usefully be examined from the perspective of unconstitutional
conditions doctrine, which, while far from coherent, focuses our attention on
crucial aspects of the registration system arising from its regulatory nature: Is
the only constitutionally permissible purpose of trademark registration to
improve the information quality of truthful or non-deceptive signals that con-
sumers receive?  Even if so, can our concept of “quality” consider the harm
done to significant segments of the population by having disparaging or scan-
dalous terms commercialized?
III. THE ROLE OF UNCONSTITUTIONAL CONDITIONS ANALYSIS
At the outset, I acknowledge that unconstitutional conditions doctrine is
an enormous hairball.54  The government may not coerce private speech
through withholding otherwise justified benefits, for example by requiring
food stamp recipients to endorse Democrats or to abstain from watching sex-
ually explicit films.  But unconstitutional conditions doctrine faces huge
problems of determining what counts as coercion, or as the appropriate base-
line from which to measure an entitlement.55  The Tam majority, nonethe-
less, relied on the doctrine in invalidating the disparagement bar.56
I disagree that section 2 imposes unconstitutional conditions.  Trade-
mark registration is in its entirety about regulating speech: who gets to regis-
ter and use which communicative symbols.  The baseline against which to
measure section 2 is therefore not “the government doesn’t interfere with a
speaker’s communication”: registration, and the related infringement rem-
edy, are all about dictating who can use which symbols for source identifica-
tion.  Relatedly, trademarks can communicate (at least) two different
things—but the only thing the government protects as a trademark is the com-
munication “this symbol stands for a particular producer.”  Under section
53 See generally Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., 131 S. Ct. 2653, 2664 (2011) (“[T]he ‘distinc-
tion between laws burdening and laws banning speech is but a matter of degree’ and [ ]
the ‘Government’s content-based burdens must satisfy the same rigorous scrutiny as its
content-based bans.’” (quoting United States v. Playboy Entm’t Grp., Inc., 529 U.S. 803,
812 (2000)).
54 See, e.g., LOUIS MICHAEL SEIDMAN & MARK V. TUSHNET, REMNANTS OF BELIEF: CON-
TEMPORARY CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUES 79 (1996); Mitchell N. Berman, Coercion Without Base-
lines: Unconstitutional Conditions in Three Dimensions, 90 GEO. L.J. 1, 3 (2001) (“The Supreme
Court’s failure to provide coherent guidance on the subject is, alas, legendary.”); Cass R.
Sunstein, Why the Unconstitutional Conditions Doctrine is an Anachronism (with Particular Refer-
ence to Religion, Speech, and Abortion), 70 B.U. L. REV. 593 (1990).
55 See Kathleen M. Sullivan, Unconstitutional Conditions, 102 HARV. L. REV. 1413, 1420
(1989) (“[D]eciding under what circumstances government offers, like private offers, are
coercive is an inevitably normative inquiry.”).
56 In re Tam, 808 F.3d 1321, 1339–41 (Fed. Cir. 2015).
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2(a), any speaker can continue to use any symbol it wants, but it can only get
a registration for matter that does not run afoul of any exclusion—for the
Washington football team, the team colors and logo.
In 1979, the Supreme Court said that trademarks have “no intrinsic
meaning” and thus that there was no First Amendment problem with the
government barring certain trademarks for fear they might be deceptive.57
It’s unclear why meaning needs to be intrinsic to be protected, but one way
to read what the Court was saying is that the source indication function of
trademark is the communication that is protected in commercial speech.
The relevant protected matter is the (truthful) link between producer and
product, which is a particular kind of semantic meaning, and the other
semantic content of the trademark is irrelevant to that.  The primary drafter
of the Lanham Act, Edward Rogers, put it this way:
[T]he trade mark in and by itself is of little importance[;] it is but the visible
manifestation of a much more important thing, a business good will[;] the
good will is the substance, the trade mark merely the shadow, and . . . this
business good will is the property to be protected against invasion.58
Under this view, a hypothetical world in which Apple was named
Microsoft, and vice versa, would not be meaningfully different from our own.
In First Amendment terms, as a source indicator, a mark is neither truth-
ful nor untruthful in advance of legally enforceable meaning,59 and—unlike
ordinary communication, where changing the words can change the mean-
ing, as the “F[***] the Draft” case, Cohen v. California,60 teaches us—a
change of mark does not change what is communicated by the trademark
function, which is the only thing trademark law regulates: this is who I am/
this is my source.  Google is Alphabet.  And it is Alphabet, the legal entity,
even if it continues to be called Google in everyday parlance.
Because the trademark function can be separated from the other com-
municative functions of a symbol, it may be regulated without having harmful
effects on those other functions.61  While the Tam majority saw section 2(a)
57 Friedman v. Rogers, 440 U.S. 1, 12 (1979).
58 Edward S. Rogers, Comments on the Modern Law of Unfair Trade, 3 ILL. L. REV. 551, 555
(1909) (footnote omitted); see also Beverly W. Pattishall, Trade-Marks and the Monopoly Pho-
bia, 50 MICH. L. REV. 967, 971 (1952) (“The benefits of achieving [trademark protection]
are twofold: first, the consumer is assured of getting the product he wants; second, the
merchant is assured of the fruits of his labor, the benefits of his good will, the results of his
enterprise (be it good or bad), and the ability to compete with others in terms of his own
reputation, his own products, and his own private identity.  A consideration of these funda-
mentals reveals that basically it is the intangible thing, the individual identity, which must
be protected—as may be necessary—not any individual word or mark, as such, which is
relied upon to achieve that identity.”).
59 Felix S. Cohen, Transcendental Nonsense and the Functional Approach, 35 COLUM. L.
REV. 809, 815 (1935) (explaining that trademark value stems from the willingness of the
government to suppress unauthorized uses on the trademark claimant’s behalf).
60 Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15 (1971).
61 The Supreme Court has made a related distinction in cases in which commercial
speech is not “inextricably intertwined” with noncommercial speech, allowing the commer-
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as regulating based on the expressive, not the commercial, elements of
speech,62 the majority had it backwards.63  The content of expression is
important to figuring out if a symbol is capable of being a trademark, but
denying trademark rights regulates only the commercial aspects of the
speaker’s message.  If the trademark owner wants to communicate other
things about itself (including “we wish to insult Native Americans” or “we
wish to reclaim a slur”), it can use other symbols in conjunction with its mark.
This distinction—which allows the government to regulate the mark, but
not to exercise any leverage over the speaker’s other speech—is consistent
with the leading unconstitutional conditions cases.  In Rust v. Sullivan,64 the
Court explained that unconstitutional conditions generally involve “situa-
tions in which the Government has placed a condition on the recipient of the
subsidy rather than on a particular program or service, thus effectively
prohibiting the recipient from engaging in the protected conduct outside
the scope of the federally funded program.”65  The Supreme Court more
recently repeated its distinction between conditions that specify what activi-
ties Congress wants to subsidize (legitimate) and those that seek to leverage
the subsidy to affect speech outside the government program
(illegitimate).66
Denying Washington’s football team any trademark rights in any symbol
as long as it also used the team name would be an unconstitutional penalty
for the exercise of First Amendment rights.  But denying it the right to any
cial elements to be regulated under Central Hudson. See Bd. of Trs. of State Univ. of N.Y. v.
Fox, 492 U.S. 469, 474 (1989) (“No law of man or of nature makes it impossible to sell
housewares without teaching home economics, or to teach home economics without sell-
ing housewares.  Nothing in the [regulation] prevents the speaker from conveying, or the
audience from hearing, these noncommercial messages, and nothing in the nature of
things requires them to be combined with commercial messages.”).
62 In re Tam, 808 F.3d 1321, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2015).
63 Actually, as Ned Snow points out, it’s a mistake to categorize “commercial” commu-
nication as the opposite of “expressive”—trademarks help consumers make decisions pre-
cisely by being communicative, which is to say expressive.  Snow, supra note 6, at 113-19.
64 500 U.S. 173 (1991); see also id. at 193 (“A refusal to fund protected activity, without
more, cannot be equated with the imposition of a ‘penalty’ on that activity.” (quoting Har-
ris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 317 n.19 (1980))).
65 Id. at 197; see also Tam, 808 F.3d at 1370 (Dyk, J., concurring in part and dissenting
in part) (arguing that the federal government “is not obligated to provide these benefits of
a trademark enforcement mechanism” as long as “trademark holders remain free to use
their marks—however disparaging—as far as the federal government is concerned.”).  Any
chilling effect or disincentive is a common effect of a failure to subsidize, and is not prob-
lematic as long as it isn’t designed to limit speech outside the subsidized program. See
Stephen R. Baird, Moral Intervention in the Trademark Arena: Banning the Registration of Scan-
dalous and Immoral Trademarks, 83 TRADEMARK REP. 661, 695 (1993) (arguing that Rust v.
Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173 (1991), supports the constitutionality of section 2(a)’s scandalous-
ness bar).
66 Agency for Int’l Dev. v. All. for Open Soc’y Int’l, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2321, 2328 (2013);
see also Tam, 808 F.3d at 1369 (Dyk, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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trademark it wants is not.  To analogize to the Confederate Veterans case,67 the
speaker is free to put a Confederate flag bumper sticker on his bumper.  He
just can’t have it on the license plate.68
69
To address an analogy a skeptical Federal Circuit judge used at the In re
Tam oral argument, rather than withdrawing police protection from a parade
because the parade is using a disfavored term, the government is providing
police protection, but requiring the parade organizers to fill out the permit
forms with a non-disparaging legal name.70
Under section 2(a), Washington’s football team can keep its name and
continue to get the government’s help suppressing counterfeits and the
other benefits of registration by relying on its non-disparaging logo and its
non-disparaging color combination.  It just can’t get the government’s help
by invoking only this particular disparaging symbol.71  Likewise, “Mr. Tam is
free to communicate his chosen message within or without commerce, so
long as he is willing to permit others to do the same.”72  If the whole product
67 Walker v. Tex. Div., Sons of Confederate Veterans, 135 S. Ct. 2239 (2015).
68 See also Agency for Int’l Dev., 133 S. Ct. at 2329-30 (discussing the ease of working
around restriction as a reason to accept content-based nature of government program).
Cf. Lee v. Superior Court, 11 Cal. Rptr. 2d 763, 765-66 (Cal. Ct. App. 1992) (analogizing
the judiciary’s ability to change a person’s legal name to the DMV’s discretion to reject
requests for personalized license plates “that may carry connotations offensive to good
taste and decency,” and noting that, “if [an applicant] had requested a license plate with
the word, ‘nigger,’ his application would be rejected” (quoting CAL. VEH. CODE § 5105
(West 2016))); Leslie Gielow Jacobs, The Public Sensibilities Forum, 95 Nw. U. L. Rev. 1357,
1431 (2001) (noting the continued availability of bumper stickers when vanity license
plates are rejected).  The bumper sticker option makes the Tam majority’s discussion of
viewpoint-based benefit denials, 808 F.3d at 1348–50, somewhat beside the point. See
Regan v. Taxation with Representation of Wash., 461 U.S. 540, 548–49 (1983) (upholding
the subsidy of certain organizations for lobbying and noting the relatively simple work-
around for unsubsidized organizations to get similar treatment); see also Leathers v.
Medlock, 499 U.S. 439, 452 (1991) (discussing Regan).
69 Domoni, Bigot Bumper, FLICKR (June 2, 2007), https://www.flickr.com/photos/tem
pleofme/531062906/.
70 Oral Argument at 11:20, Tam, 808 F.3d 1321, http://www.cafc.uscourts.gov/oral-
argument-recordings/search/audio.html?title=In+re+Tam&field_case_number_value=&
field_date_value2%5Bvalue%5D%5Bdate%5D=.
71 Or, if section 43 is still available, it just can’t have a registration.
72 Tam, 808 F.3d at 1381 (Reyna, J., dissenting).
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or service offered by the producer is our unit of analysis, then the govern-
ment’s unwillingness to take part in the disparaging or racist aspects of the
message communicated by the mark may itself be a sufficient interest to jus-
tify the exclusion, given that the government is not gaining any leverage over
the message appearing outside the registered matter, any more than it has
leverage over the message appearing on a bumper sticker because it has the
power to approve or disapprove license plates.73
What if the speaker doesn’t want to use anything but the scandalous/
disparaging term to identify itself?  In this situation alone, it would be forced
to change its overall message in order to receive trademark protection.
74
But so would a producer who wanted to sell cans of root beer in white
cans with ROOT BEER in big black letters as the only symbol—that’s generic
for root beer.  So would a non-Barq’s producer who wanted to sell cans of
root beer with “BARQ’s” written on them.  The producer is already being
forced to shape its message in many ways if it wants to take advantage of the
trademark system, which is not the same as the usual unconstitutional condi-
tions situation.  The government must weigh in on the validity of a speaker’s
choice of marks if the mark is to be enforced against others.  That is, because
the entire system of trademark registration is a system of speech regulation, it
is very different from the unconstitutional conditions cases finding that the
government overstepped its bounds.
Relatedly, there’s an extensive history of the government deciding that
only some names can be formal, “government” names.  Some names just
don’t serve the government’s legitimate needs:
73 Cf. Sunstein, supra note 54, at 607 (“In the spending context, the government may
be able to invoke justifications that are tightly connected to, and become legitimate
because of, the very fact that it is engaging in those activities.  In the public school setting,
for example, government can plausibly justify its selectivity by the need to ensure that pub-
lic funds are not spent on religious activities.”).
74 Allen, Albertson’s Generic Root Beer, 1980, FLICKR (July 14, 2012), https://www.flickr
.com/photos/roadsidepictures/7569568348/.
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75
This isn’t just a hypothetical: Jennifer Null, like others with her surname,
can’t use most modern computer databases because her name is a term used
to separate database fields.76  The Nulls’ problem is created by a content-
based system, and the government probably lacks a compelling interest in
having any given name processing system and would indeed be better advised
to use parameterized statements77—but it would be very strange to say that
the government violated the Nulls’ First Amendment rights by refusing to
recognize their names as names.
When it comes to personal names by which human beings are known,
the rule is generally that a person may adopt, and ask other private actors to
use, any name she chooses.  But the government need not accept that self-
designation if it would risk deception, interfere with administration (as spe-
cial characters or thousand-letter names could), or involve the government
in appearing to endorse a discriminatory name.  The First Amendment rea-
soning in such cases is the same as for marks that fail section 2—as long as
the person is free to use her chosen name, the government’s refusal to make
the name change official does not violate her free speech rights.78  While the
75 Exploits of a Mom, XKCD (last visited Sept. 13, 2016), https://xkcd.com/327/ (Alt-
text: “[h]er daughter is named Help I’m stuck in a driver’s license factory.”).
76 Chris Baraniuk, These Unlucky People Have Names That Break Computers, BBC (Mar. 25,
2016), http://www.bbc.com/future/story/20160325-the-names-that-break-computer-sys-
tems (also discussing issues with single-letter surnames, people with only a single name,
and extremely long surnames).
77 See About Bobby Tables and SQL Injection, BOBBY TABLES: A GUIDE TO PREVENTING SQL
INJECTION (last visited Sept. 13, 2016), http://bobby-tables.com/about.html.
78 Lee v. Superior Court, 11 Cal. Rptr. 2d 763, 764 (Cal. Ct. App. 1992) (rejecting a
legal name change to a racial epithet and holding that “[a]ppellant has the common law
right to use whatever name he chooses.  He may conduct whatever social experiment he
chooses.  However, he has no statutory right to require the State of California to partici-
pate therein.”); see also In re Variable for Change of Name v. Nash, 190 P.3d 354, 356 (N.M.
Ct. App. 2008) (“Petitioner has a right under the common law to assume any name that he
wants so long as no fraud or misrepresentation is involved. . . . Petitioner may make a
political statement by changing his name, but once he seeks the state’s imprimatur he is
subject to the court’s discretion in granting the government’s approval of the name.” (first
citing In re Ferner, 685 A.2d 78, 80 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1996); then citing In re Rivera,
627 N.Y.S.2d 241, 244 (N.Y. Civ. Ct. 1995)). Cf. Kushner, supra note 39, at 339 (arguing
that, while the government may not refuse official recognition to name changes on arbi-
trary grounds, it may deny official recognition to “names with offensive content, because
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Tam majority claimed that trademark owners couldn’t “realistically have two
brand names, one inoffensive, non-disparaging one (which would be able to
secure registration) and a second, expressive, disparaging one (which would
be unregistrable and unprotectable),”79 that dual system of official and unof-
ficial names is in fact common in the real world with respect to personal
names—we speak of the famous judge Learned Hand, for example, but his
friends knew him as Bunny; Stefani Germanotta has not changed her legal
name, but is generally known by her stage name, Lady Gaga.80  This practice
also finds ready analogies in brands that make unprotectable generic terms
large parts of their branding, such as SUBWAY’S FOOTLONG, or in the
Washington team’s indisputably valid trademarks for its logo and colors.
Under various theoretical approaches to unconstitutional conditions,
moreover, section 2(a) seems legitimate.  For example, Kathleen Sullivan has
offered a theory of unconstitutional conditions that relies on a distributive
understanding of constitutional rights.81  Among other things, people with
fewer resources, she argues, shouldn’t be forced to give up constitutional
rights to access things—like money to pay for food—that people with more
resources have without surrendering their constitutional rights.82  This the-
ory would seem to approve section 2’s exclusions, which are distributionally
neutral.  Dan Snyder can continue to use the mark if he wants to, even with-
out the government’s aid.83
such content-based restrictions will be found to be reasonably related to the purpose of the
[limited public] forum” of official names).
79 808 F.3d 1321, 1351 (Fed. Cir. 2015).
80 See GERALD GUNTHER, LEARNED HAND: THE MAN AND THE JUDGE 2 (2d ed. 2011);
Kate Beaudoin, The Story of How Lady Gaga Became Famous Will Make You Like Her Even More,
MUSIC.MIC (Mar. 10, 2015), https://mic.com/articles/112334/the-story-of-how-lady-gaga-
became-famous-will-make-you-like-her-even-more#.FLyJ4sp25. Cf. Patrick McKenzie, False-
hoods Programmers Believe About Names, KALZUMEUS (June 17, 2010), http://www.kalzumeus
.com/2010/06/17/falsehoods-programmers-believe-about-names/ (discussing numerous
situations in which naming conventions and behavior differ from formal recording
systems).
81 Sullivan, supra note 55, at 1421 (“Unconstitutional conditions implicate three dis-
tributive concerns.  The first is the boundary between the public and the private realms,
which government can shift through the allocation of benefits as readily as through the use
or threat of force.  Whatever the reason to preserve a realm of private autonomy from
government encroachment, unconstitutional conditions present the same structural threat
to that realm: they permit circumvention of existing constitutional restraints on direct reg-
ulation.  The second distributive concern of unconstitutional conditions doctrine is the
maintenance of government neutrality or evenhandedness among rightholders.  The third
is the prevention of constitutional caste: discrimination among rightholders who would
otherwise make the same constitutional choice, on the basis of their relative dependency
on a government benefit.”).
82 Id. at 1497–99.
83 The rule is distributionally neutral in other ways: all speakers can choose protect-
able marks, so there’s no necessary redistribution among speakers as a result of the exclu-
sions; poor speakers aren’t particularly dependent on government for trademark
protection (if anything they are less likely to invoke it). Cf. Sullivan, supra note 55, at 1490
(“[A]n unconstitutional condition can skew the distribution of constitutional rights among
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Simon Tam has a case for further harm, claiming that he’s lost record
deals because record companies want to be able to secure a registration for
any name a band uses.  However, the private choices of third parties probably
shouldn’t weigh into the First Amendment calculus here—an employer that
won’t make matching donations to an employee’s chosen charity unless it has
501(c)(3) nonprofit status doesn’t thereby increase the First Amendment
constraints on the government in approving charities.  This is especially true
where, as here, the claimed problem would arise whatever the reason for the
refusal to register was—the record contract would also be denied if Mr. Tam
wanted to perform as THE DOORS (confusing) or ROCK BAND (generic),
because those names aren’t registrable either.
Mitchell Berman and Seth Kreimer, among others, have argued that one
useful way of analyzing the unconstitutional conditions question is to ask
whether, if the government knew its condition wouldn’t work at deterring or
punishing speech, would it prefer to extend the benefit to the targeted per-
son or to withhold it anyway?84  As Berman points out:
[T]he Pentagon’s decision to buy time for armed forces recruitment com-
mercials only during televised sporting events also burdens the exercise of
First Amendment rights of a broadcaster that chooses to replace its weekly
college basketball telecasts with reruns of Murder, She Wrote.  It therefore
becomes critical to determine whether the burden is a penalty.85
The government wants to reach people who watch basketball; even if it
knew that it would have no effect on the amount of basketball broadcast, it
would still want to restrict its funding in this way.  On this reasoning, section
2(a)’s exclusions are not unconstitutional conditions, given that the consis-
tent position of the government is that it is legitimate to keep using the chal-
lenged symbol even if it’s not registered.  The government’s formal position
towards a disparaging mark is the same as its position towards functional mat-
ter: use it if you want, but don’t use it as an indicator of source.
A number of cases and commentators have also suggested germaneness
to the program’s aims as a standard for determining whether a condition is
unconstitutional: you can be denied Temporary Assistance for Needy Fami-
lies because you are making too much money, but not because you protested
rightholders because it necessarily discriminates facially between those who do and those
who do not comply with the condition. . . . [T]o the extent that a condition discriminates
de facto between those who do and do not depend on a government benefit, it can create
an undesirable caste hierarchy in the enjoyment of constitutional rights.”).
84 See, e.g., Berman, supra note 54, at 37 (“If (counterfactually) the government knew
that granting or withholding an offered benefit would have no effect on the exercise of a
particular right, and would nonetheless withhold the benefit, then it lacks a (but-for) pur-
pose to discourage exercise of the right.  If it would grant the benefit under the hypotheti-
cal assumption, then its purpose in withholding the benefit when the assumption is
abandoned is indeed to deter exercise of the right, which is to say that the withholding of
the benefit is a penalty, which makes the conditional threat coercive.”); see also Seth F.
Kreimer, Allocational Sanctions: The Problem of Negative Rights in a Positive State, 132 U. PA. L.
REV. 1293 (1984).
85 Berman, supra note 54, at 80.
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the government.86  Because registration is inherently about the content of
the registrant’s mark, though, germaneness here reduces to the prior ques-
tion of whether it’s legitimate for the government to have this preference for
non-disparaging marks.  As long as the government is heavily involved in
defining and enforcing trademark rights, the government’s hands-off posi-
tion on disparagement should be constitutional.
IV. THE CORROSIVE EFFECT OF TREATING SECTION 2(A) AS SUSPECT
CONTENT-BASED REGULATION
Suppose one finds all these arguments unpersuasive.  What then?  Dis-
paragement and scandalousness aren’t the only grounds on which registra-
tion can be denied.  This Part explains how difficult it would be to cabin most
forms of First Amendment scrutiny just to those aspects of registration
attacked in Tam.  I will first situate trademark within commercial speech doc-
trine, which gives special weight to regulating false and misleading speech,
and then demonstrate that, if subjected to strict or even intermediate scru-
tiny, other parts of the registration system would also perform as poorly as
disparagement.
A. The Relevance of Commercial Speech
If we define “content-based” as literally as Reed87 does, all of the exclu-
sions in section 2, with the exception of utilitarian functionality, are content-
based—they require an evaluation of the meaning of the symbol at issue.
Reed is not, however, the only consideration, because Reed did not consider
the continuing vitality of commercial speech doctrine.88  The adoption of a
symbol as an indication of the source of goods or services—that is, the adop-
tion of a trademark—is generally commercial speech.89  While nonprofits
86 The Tam majority mischaracterizes unconstitutional conditions doctrine as being
about what the government can do to get its own message out. In re Tam, 808 F.3d 1321,
1352 (Fed. Cir. 2015).  But the unconstitutional conditions doctrine applies to a far
broader range of programs than those in which the government is trying to send its own
message; it applies when the government is trying to achieve a legitimate aim.
87 Reed v. Town of Gilbert, 135 S. Ct. 2218 (2015).
88 So far, lower courts have generally held that “Reed does not concern commercial
speech, and therefore does not disturb the framework which holds that commercial speech
[regulation] is subject only to intermediate scrutiny as defined by the Central Hudson test.”
Contest Promotions, LLC v. City & Cty. of S.F., No. 15-cv-00093, 2015 WL 4571564, at *4
(N.D. Cal. July 28, 2015); see also Dana’s R.R. Supply v. Attorney Gen., 807 F.3d 1235, 1248
(11th Cir. 2015); Chiropractors United for Research & Educ., LLC v. Conway, No. 3:15-CV-
00556, 2015 WL 5822721, at *5 (W.D. Ky. Oct. 1, 2015); CTIA—The Wireless Ass’n v. City
of Berkeley, 139 F. Supp. 3d 1048, 1061 (N.D. Cal. 2015); Cal. Outdoor Equity Partners v.
City of Corona, No. CV 15-03172, 2015 WL 4163346, at *9–10 (C.D. Cal. July 9, 2015).
89 Denicola, supra note 21, at 193 (“The adoption of a symbol as a trademark is a form
of commercial speech.  The trademark ordinarily communicates information concerning
source or quality. . . . The purpose remains to attract prospective consumers, and the use
thus serves as ‘part of a proposal of a commercial transaction.’” (footnote omitted) (quot-
ing Friedman v. Rogers, 440 U.S. 1, 11 (1979))); see also Friedman, 440 U.S. at 11 & n.10
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and noncommercial speakers in the First Amendment sense such as the New
York Times can own trademarks, the function of the trademark is still to iden-
tify them as sources of goods or services in commerce.90  Likewise, although
team jerseys may be used by their purchasers to communicate love of Wash-
ington’s football team, the team, as seller, uses the name to identify itself to
those in the market for team merchandise.91  (Even those who deny that
trademarks are commercial speech revert to that doctrine under pressure.
While the Tam majority claimed that commercial speech rules didn’t apply, it
relied only on commercial speech doctrine when it stated that section 2’s
prohibitions on deceptive and confusing marks posed no constitutional prob-
lem, a claim that would be untrue if trademarks were noncommercial
speech.92)
Under the Central Hudson rule governing commercial speech, false or
misleading commercial speech may be banned.93  In addition, the 1979 case
of Friedman v. Rogers allowed Texas to require optometrists to use their per-
(“[T]he mere solicitation of patronage implicit in a trade name” is “a form of commercial
speech.”); Pro-Football, Inc. v. Blackhorse, 112 F. Supp. 3d 439, 457 n.6 (E.D. Va. 2015)
(“Because trademarks are source-identifiers that ‘reduce[ ] the customer’s cost[ ] of shop-
ping and making purchasing decisions,’ . . . they necessarily pertain to commercial transac-
tions and are thus commercial speech . . . .” (quoting Dastar Corp. v. Twentieth Century
Film Corp., 539 U.S. 23, 34 (2003))); N.Y. Yankees P’ship v. IET Prods. & Servs., Inc., 114
U.S.P.Q.2d 1497, at *1508 (T.T.A.B. 2015) (trademark is inherently commercial speech,
making the registration decision a commercial speech decision).
90 See United We Stand Am., Inc. v. United We Stand, Am. N.Y., Inc., 128 F.3d 86, 88
(2d Cir. 1997) (allowing use of Lanham Act to enjoin name of political party that was
leading donors to send money to the wrong entity).
91 See In re Tam, 808 F.3d 1321, 1377 (Reyna, J., dissenting) (“All three factors [the
Supreme Court used to identify commercial speech] are necessarily also present in trade-
marks.  Trademarks are used to identify specific products and to advertise the sources of
those products.  Trademarks, and in particular those federally registered for exclusive use
in interstate commerce, are necessarily tools of commerce used with an ‘economic
motive.’”).
92 Id. at 1329 (majority opinion) (citing only commercial speech cases in stating that
bars on registration of marks that are likely to “cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or to
deceive,” Lanham Act section 2(d), or that are “deceptively misdescriptive,” section 2(e),
“do not run afoul of the First Amendment”).  If, as other portions of the decision claim,
trademarks aren’t commercial speech (or registration isn’t commercial speech), id. at
1337–38, 1355, then those decisions aren’t relevant and the harm rule of Alvarez would
seem to apply.  Furthermore, if deception from commercial speech is merely potential, not
inherent or actual—surely the case for all deceptively misdescriptive marks and many con-
fusing marks—the government must require a disclaimer, and isn’t allowed to impose an
outright ban. See, e.g., Pearson v. Shalala, 164 F.3d 650, 655–59 (D.C. Cir. 1999).  But the
PTO never instructs applicants that they must include disclaimers of affiliation, or of the
deceptively misdescriptive meaning at issue, in their marks in order to receive a registra-
tion.  True, a disclaimer requirement would fit poorly with the idea of trademark as short-
hand for commercial information, but that very consideration suggests that the Tam court
is mistaken to so blithely equate the remaining section 2 bars with completely unprotected
false or misleading commercial speech.
93 Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n of N.Y., 447 U.S. 557 (1980).
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sonal names, rather than chain names or other trademarks, because the
Court held that trademarks didn’t have inherent informational content and
thus a ban on certain trademarks didn’t interfere with information
transmission:
[T]he restriction on the use of trade names has only the most incidental
effect on the content of the commercial speech of Texas optometrists.  As
noted above, a trade name conveys information only because of the associa-
tions that grow up over time between the name and a certain level of price
and quality of service. . . . Since the Act does not prohibit or limit . . . infor-
mational advertising [such as advertising about prices,] the factual informa-
tion associated with trade names may be communicated freely and explicitly
to the public.94
Because trademarks don’t have inherent meaning, in other words, gov-
ernment regulation of which trademarks certain professionals could use did
not assume paternalistically that consumers would misuse truthful informa-
tion, which is the usual problem the Supreme Court has with direct bans on
truthful, nonmisleading commercial speech.95  Optometrists could commu-
nicate “the factual information”96 at issue—their association with a larger
chain—freely; they just couldn’t use a symbol for that factual information as
their trademark.
Judge Dyk’s partial dissent in Tam likewise appealed to the dual function
of symbols as source-indicators and as conveyors of information (or perhaps
persuasion).  He contended that there was no legitimate informational value
in disparaging marks, and thus nothing meriting their First Amendment pro-
tection as source indicators:
It is certainly difficult to imagine, for example, how the disparaging ele-
ments of an advertisement such as “CHLORINOL SODA BLEACHING—we
are going to use Chlorinol and be like de white nigger,” or “The Plucky
Little Jap Shredded Wheat Biscuit,” or “Dr. Scott’s Electric Hair Brush—will
not save an Indian’s scalp from his enemies but it will preserve yours from
dandruff,” further any legitimate “informational function” associated with
the relevant product.97
94 440 U.S. 1, 15–16 (1979).
95 The facts of Friedman make clear that distinguishing between (apparently illegiti-
mate) paternalism and (legitimate) consumer protection may be no easy task.  Texas
banned the use of certain trade names so that optometry chains couldn’t get the advan-
tages of extensive recognition through using a brand name across locations and time, on
the theory that consumers needed to know the name of the particular optometrists who’d
examine them and that they could be fooled into thinking that quality was the same as
they’d had in the past. See id. at 12–13.  Why this wasn’t just fear of consumers using
truthful information—‘this location is part of a chain’—badly is not fully explained by the
Court. See id. at 21 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
96 Id. at 16 (majority opinion).
97 808 F.3d at 1373 (Dyk, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (footnotes
omitted) (first quoting Julian Casablancas, 15 Shockingly Racist Vintage Ads, BUSINESS PUNDIT
(Dec. 17, 2012), http://www.businesspundit.com/15-shockingly-racist-vintage-ads/; then
quoting Recreation’s Advertiser, RECREATION, Jan. 1906, at 493; then quoting BRIAN D. BEHN-
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Thus, no principle required that disparaging terms be recognized as trade-
marks, even if they could not and should not be banned.
A court relying on Friedman could perhaps stop there and uphold sec-
tion 2(a).  Given the changes in First Amendment doctrine since Friedman
was decided, however, and given Friedman’s own failure to draw a clear line
between the non-informative and the misleading, it is worth considering what
would happen to trademark registration, and trademark law as a whole, if full
First Amendment scrutiny were brought to bear on it.  With this exercise, I
hope to show that such a move would be misguided; the mistake is treating
registration as if it were a speech ban rather than as a government program.
B. What Real Scrutiny of Registration Would Look Like
In other contexts, regulations of truthful, nonmisleading commercial
speech must actually serve a substantial government interest and be no more
restrictive than necessary to serve that interest.  Since false and misleading
commercial speech can just be banned, the government can probably take
the lesser action of refusing to support it.  Thus, any bars sufficiently related
to deception might pass muster, but the other bars would have to survive
Central Hudson or strict scrutiny.98
1. Deception-Adjacent Bars
Which section 2 bars are sufficiently related to consumer deception and
therefore arguably acceptable under heightened scrutiny, even if consumer
KEN & GREGORY D. SMITHERS, RACISM IN AMERICAN POPULAR MEDIA: FROM AUNT JEMIMA TO
THE FRITO BANDITO 39 (2015)).
98 Cf. Denicola, supra note 21, at 194–95 (expressing doubt that misappropriation and
dilution rationales for allowing trademark owners to suppress others’ uses could survive
Central Hudson scrutiny, absent consumer confusion).  One possible alternative standard
could be taken from analogy to mandatory disclosure cases.  The Zauderer line of cases
deals with the government mandating additional speech, rather than outright barring par-
ticular commercial speech. See Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel, 471 U.S. 626
(1985). Zauderer involved attorney advertising that told laypeople that if the lawyer lost
their case, there’d be no fee. Id. at 629.  The Supreme Court held that the state could
require an additional disclosure clarifying that fees and costs were different things and
that, if they lost, they’d still be liable for costs. Id. at 652.  The Court did not require the
mandatory disclosure to satisfy Central Hudson, but applied something like rational basis
review—as long as the required disclosure was truthful and noncontroversial, and not
unduly burdensome, it was constitutional. Id. at 651.
A refusal to provide trademark protection is much more like requiring disclosures
than like a speech ban: it may create an economic burden and thus a possible disincentive
for the speech, but it doesn’t suppress that speech directly.  The analogy to disclosure is in
the indirect burden on non-false commercial speech, not on the exact mechanism by
which the burden occurs.  But is it “unduly” burdensome to deny trademark registration
or, in its entirety, trademark protection?  This question can’t be answered except norma-
tively—denial of registration isn’t like a disclosure that takes three minutes to recite when
most ads are only thirty seconds long.  Undue burden is probably best assessed under the
general category of unconstitutional conditions, discussed in the previous Part.
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protection might not have been their initial impetus?  The ban on registering
deceptive marks seems obvious.  Marks that create a false association with
persons, institutions, or religions also have some kind of deceptiveness built
in, as do geographically deceptively misdescriptive marks.99  However, issues
of tailoring and evidence would remain.  If barring use of deceptive marks is
possible, then all the subject matter-specific, deception-adjacent bans such as
those banning use of a person’s name without consent seem to fail the least
restrictive means test.  The less restrictive means already present in the stat-
ute is to make an individualized determination rather than to deter all uses
of marks within a class, even if that class runs a higher than average risk of
being deceptive.
Likewise, the ability of the PTO to use inference and common sense,
without considering the actual marketplace context of a mark’s use that
might avoid deception in practice, might make deceptiveness refusals overin-
clusive.  As it stands, the PTO can refuse registration even when the applicant
shows that matter outside the applied-for mark makes actual deception
unlikely,100 or when a term has a non-deceptive meaning that can be clari-
fied by the rest of a product’s packaging.101  If, as courts are beginning to
suggest, prophylactic anti-confusion rules aren’t narrowly tailored enough to
survive strict scrutiny,102 and regulators have to try allowing both the poten-
tially confusing speech and the disclaimer first, then trademark law’s unwill-
ingness to consider disclaimers outside the applied-for matter seems
constitutionally suspect.
Separately, refusing registration doesn’t stop the use of the mark to
deceive people, meaning that the harm inflicted on the applicant doesn’t
necessarily further the government’s interest.  Indeed, if the government’s
refusal is correct, then by hypothesis the applicant’s use of a deceptive term is
material to consumers, thus helping to sell the product.  Even absent a regis-
tration, the applicant would have every incentive to continue using the
deceptive term, even if it adopted an additional trademark.  An outright ban
99 This fact is all the more relevant after the Federal Circuit rewrote the test in In re
Cal. Innovations, Inc., 329 F.3d 1334, 1337 (Fed. Cir. 2003), to require that geographic
misdescriptiveness be materially deceptive to consumers.  The United States adopted an
additional exclusion for geographic terms for wine and spirits as part of our obligations
under TRIPS.  15 U.S.C. § 1052(a) (2012).  The only thing that must be shown to trigger
this alcohol-specific bar is that the term does indicate a place other than the origin of the
goods, so it need not be believed (ALASKA CHARDONNAY) nor material to consumer
decisions, but this might still be justified on a prophylactic deception-avoidance rationale.
100 See, e.g., In re Volk Art, Inc., 1998 WL 377661, at *4 (T.T.A.B. 1998) (rejecting appli-
cant’s argument that actual sales context would avoid confusion caused by term that could
be misleading in the abstract).
101 See, e.g., In re Wadhwa, 2016 WL 1045678, at *2–6 (T.T.A.B. 2016) (finding that
“EM” was a term for supplements containing “effective microorganisms,” not contained in
applicant’s goods, though they did contain “essential minerals” or “electrolyte minerals”).
102 See Pursuing America’s Greatness v. Fed. Election Comm’n, No. 15-5264 (D.C. Cir.
Aug. 2, 2016).
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on the use of the deceptive term would be appropriately tailored to the gov-
ernment’s interest, but refusing registration wouldn’t be.
The bar on registering marks confusingly similar to marks already regis-
tered or in use also seems, at first look, highly connected to deception.103
However, the standard used to refuse registration doesn’t take real likelihood
of confusion into account, because it deliberately abstracts away from market-
place context, including additional distinguishing features that in practice
always appear next to a supposedly confusing mark.  For example, if Tam’s
THE SLANTS is ultimately registered, an application to register THE
SLANTS would be refused for a second band even if in reality the second
band always accompanied the term with a clear distinguishing feature, such
as “the really racist ones.”  Thus, the PTO doesn’t measure real likelihood of
confusion, and the reason isn’t that confusion in the abstract is so likely to
overlap with confusion in reality that a more fact-intensive test is unwar-
ranted.  Instead, the reason is to make the registration system work by provid-
ing a searchable, understandable list of what terms are off-limits to other
businesses.  Having two separate THE SLANTS registrations for identical ser-
vices would be inconsistent with that systemic objective—but administrative
convenience is generally not a sufficient justification for limiting First
Amendment rights.
Separately, the test for the bar on registering nongeographic deceptively
misdescriptive marks requires that the misdescription, while likely to be
believed by consumers, be immaterial to them—otherwise, the mark would
be outright deceptive and unregistrable.  Deceptively misdescriptive marks,
because they deceive only about immaterial matters, are registrable if they
attain secondary meaning, which means that consumers recognize them as
indicators of source.  But under United States v. Alvarez,104 which invalidated a
criminal penalty imposed on lying as such without an additional element of
harm, this immateriality would seem to doom the bar, given the lack of harm
to consumers.
The bar on registering a name, picture, or signature of a living person
(or president whose widow or widower still lives) without the person’s written
consent also seems plausible as a legislative prediction at the wholesale level
about the risk of false endorsement.  If such predictions are allowed, it might
well survive—although the discrimination in favor of a dead president with a
living widow/er seems problematic, since it’s hard to see why creating a con-
nection with a dead president is worse than creating a connection with any
other well-known person who died and left a widow(er).105
Even the bar on registering flags and other indicia of states, nations, and
other political units arguably has some relationship to preventing deception,
103 See In re Tam, 808 F.3d 1321, 1329 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (stating that such bars were
constitutionally unproblematic).
104 132 S. Ct. 2537, 2545, 2551 (2012) (plurality opinion).
105 Cf. R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 388 (1992) (concluding that it is worse to
assassinate a president than to kill an ordinary citizen, and thus penalties for the former
can be enhanced without violating the First Amendment).
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in that this is a subclass of signifiers whose potential for abuse is so great that
Congress could legitimately make a blanket rule without requiring case by
case evaluation.106  Nonetheless, like the bar on deceptive marks, there’s a
risk that this bar is not fit for the purpose of preventing deception, since it
doesn’t block actual use.  Moreover, it’s notable that no deception need be
shown to trigger the insignia bar: consumers need not even recognize the
flag as a flag of a nation.  For example, a district court recently cancelled one
of RE/MAX’s registered marks—the one on the top right of the image
below—because it was identical to the flag of the Netherlands, even though
RE/MAX produced a survey indicating that almost all Americans have no
idea what the flag of the Netherlands looks like.107  Such an absolute bar,
involving no deception, would seem dubious under strict scrutiny, or even
under Central Hudson.
106 See Renna v. Cty. of Union, 88 F. Supp. 3d 310 (D.N.J. 2014).  But why exclude even
the actual political entity from registering its own flag or insignia?  That seems overbroad if
the concern is only deceptiveness in the ordinary sense; the Swiss government wouldn’t
deceive consumers by marking its products with the Swiss flag. See Paris Convention for
the Protection of Industrial Property, art. 6ter(1)(a), Mar. 20, 1883, 13 U.S.T. 2, 828
U.N.T.S. 305, as last revised at Stockholm on July 14, 1967, 21 U.S.T. 1538, 828 U.N.T.S.
303, and amended on Sept. 28, 1979 [hereinafter Paris Convention] (prohibiting registra-
tion and “use . . . as trademarks” without authorization of competent authorities of “armorial
bearings, flags, and other State emblems” and other official signs of Paris Union coun-
tries).  The Renna court offered one justification: trademark rights are poorly suited to the
appropriate scope of a government’s right to prevent unauthorized use of its insignia, and
could too easily be used to suppress critical speech about a government entity. Renna, 88
F. Supp. 3d at 323.  Instead, anti-impersonation rules not tied to commercial uses should
do the necessary work.
107 RE/MAX LLC v. M.L. Jones & Assocs., Ltd., No. 5:12-CV-768, 2014 WL 7405461, at
*3 n.2 (E.D.N.C. Dec. 30, 2014).
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Additionally, RE/MAX had a standalone registration for the three bars,
but in the real world, the bars always appear with the balloon design and RE/
MAX’s name superimposed on them, further preventing consumers from
making any actual connection with the Netherlands.108  Here again, the dis-
tinctive character of registration makes it hard to link up with confusion-
based rationales.
2. Information-Related Bars
What about section 2 bars related to factual information transmitted to
consumers, but not so much to deception?  For example, merely descriptive
(or deceptively misdescriptive, or geographically misdescriptive) marks are
not deceptive when a trademark claimant uses them.  Instead, there are pol-
icy reasons why we want other producers to be free to use them as well.
Claimants could cause harm to the marketplace by gaining monopoly rights
over them.  Is that enough of a justification to sustain these bars, given that
they are content-discriminatory by our excitingly broad definition of content
discrimination?
We could assert that the bar on registering descriptive terms survives
strict scrutiny, but I don’t see how that can be true without doing serious
damage to the concept of strict scrutiny.  For example, we already have a less
restrictive alternative than barring registration in the very same statute: we
could allow registration of descriptive marks, and give everyone else a
descriptive fair use defense, just as we do now when a descriptive term has
secondary meaning and is registrable.109  This defense allows other produc-
ers to use a term in its descriptive sense, but not as a trademark, fairly and in
good faith—so there can be a valid trademark in “LOOKS LIKE A PUMP,
FEELS LIKE A SNEAKER” for shoes, while a competitor can say of its own
high-heeled pump “Think Of It As A Sneaker With No Strings Attached.”110
Of course, having the descriptive fair use defense is not as good for competi-
tors as full freedom to use a descriptive term lacking secondary meaning.
But is that marginal difference enough to survive full First Amendment scru-
tiny?  To say yes, we should be willing to say that all the government needs to
refuse registration is a pretty good reason—bringing us back to the norma-
tive question of acceptable reasons.
The real reason the government denies trademark protection to merely
descriptive uses is not to punish the claimant for its speech, but because
there’s not a sufficient justification to grant a private right in such terms,
especially given the needs of others to use them.  One core purpose of trade-
mark is to allow consumers to rely on nonfunctional symbols as indicators of
source, so they can use those symbols to select the products and services they
want.  By definition, a descriptive term without secondary meaning doesn’t
work that way for consumers (just as the disparaging meaning of a disparag-
108 Id. at *3.
109 Lanham Act § 33(b)(4), 15 U.S.C. § 1115(b)(4) (2012).
110 U.S. Shoe Corp. v. Brown Grp., Inc., 740 F. Supp. 196, 197 (S.D.N.Y. 1990).
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ing term may be so insulting that it detracts from any identification function,
at least for the targeted group), so a producer who uses such a term can be
excluded from the government program. Central Hudson’s framework can
probably accommodate this rationale, but not strict scrutiny.
One final non-deceptive, but information-related, consideration comes
from our treaty obligations.  For example, the provisions for wines and spir-
its, and for geographically deceptively misdescriptive marks, are required by
our adherence to the Paris Convention111 and to NAFTA, and we could take
note of an apparent international consensus that misstatements about certain
matters are wrongful even if they are not material.
The fact that the acid logic of current First Amendment protection
makes the bar on registering merely descriptive or misdescriptive terms seem
even arguably questionable shows that something has gone seriously wrong
with the Supreme Court’s condemnation of content-based regulation, which
has now become detached from the underlying justifications that one might
reasonably give for worrying about content-based regulation.  This is com-
pounded by the difficulty of using a test about suppressing speech to evaluate
whether the government can refuse to give a registration, or even a private
right of action, to a commercial speaker.
3. Utilitarian Functionality
Utilitarian functionality is a doctrine precluding protection under trade-
mark law, either for registration or in infringement cases, where the feature
at issue makes the product or service better or cheaper.  Functionality is a
pure situation in which communicative conduct is regulated because of its
noncommunicative elements.112  The governing standard for evaluating reg-
ulations that suppress communicative elements of conduct comes from
United States v. O’Brien.113  By definition, a symbol that is functioning as a
mark, but also possesses utilitarian functionality, is not barred from registra-
tion or protection because of anything about its ability to communicate the
source of a product.  Instead, functional matter is barred from protection
because of the other things it does, just as the government supposedly pun-
ished O’Brien for burning his draft card not because of his anti-war message
111 Paris Convention, supra note 106, at art. 6ter(1)(a) (requiring a bar on registration
and use of “armorial bearings, flags, and other State emblems” and other official signs of
Paris Union countries without permission from the relevant entity).
112 “Aesthetic functionality,” in which the sensory characteristics of a product are practi-
cally or socially of such importance to the product that free access to those characteristics is
necessary for fair competition, arguably requires an assessment of a symbol’s communica-
tive impact.  One example of aesthetic functionality might be a heart-shaped box for hold-
ing candy for Valentine’s Day. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 17, illus. 8
(AM. LAW. INST. 1995).  Aesthetic functionality might be another content-based limitation
on trademark rights; nonetheless, it is perfectly justifiable and might even survive strict
scrutiny.
113 391 U.S. 367 (1968).
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but because it needed that draft card for other purposes.114  Indeed, unlike
O’Brien itself, where (despite the Court’s implausible denial of bad motive)
disagreement with O’Brien’s anti-war speech clearly affected the govern-
ment’s decisions, there’s no reason to disbelieve the government’s content-
indifferent rationale for the functionality exclusion.
Nonetheless, the government rule has effects on speech—it discourages
the communicative use of functional features, because you can’t get protec-
tion for them.  Under O’Brien, a law that burdens expressive conduct is
unconstitutional, even absent any bad state purposes, unless “it furthers an
important or substantial governmental interest; . . . and if the incidental
restriction on alleged First Amendment freedoms is no greater than is essen-
tial to the furtherance of that interest.”115
In some sense the exclusion for functional matter is motivated by the
government’s desire to shape the universe of communicative devices so that
it doesn’t overlap with the universe of functional features.  There’s just noth-
ing wrong with that desire even if it’s characterized as speech-related.  This is
why Justice Breyer and the Justices in agreement with him are right that the
term “content-based” as recently used in Reed is unsustainably overbroad.  For
functionality, the government interest is substantial and the restriction is
exactly coterminous with the government interest.  So at least functionality
would survive Central Hudson and O’Brien scrutiny both as a bar to registra-
tion and as a total bar to protection.
C. The Lanham Act Is Broadly Vulnerable Under Enhanced Scrutiny
Overall, it seems unlikely that any but functionality and the specifically
deception-related provisions of section 2 could survive strict scrutiny, and
even a number of them are shaky because only one—deceptiveness—
requires the PTO to show that the deception would affect consumer deci-
sions (materiality).116  Even likely confusion with an existing trademark
doesn’t require any showing that consumers would change their behavior
because of the confusion or that the senior trademark owner would suffer
any other harm.  That rule would seem to make section 2 much like the
Stolen Valor Act, which was struck down for lack of a sufficient connection
between deception and harm.117
114 Id. at 382.
115 Id. at 377.
116 Even deceptiveness doesn’t involve an assessment of materiality in actual purchasing
decisions, only in the abstract based on the goods and services listed in the application, so
the applicant can’t show that sales channels or other context will avoid deception.
117 It’s true that the Alvarez concurrence and dissent used trademark as an example of a
non-problematic regime, but I place little weight on that, not only because Justice Breyer’s
concurrence got the details of trademark law quite wrong, but also because the Court
wasn’t asked to perform any analysis of trademark law in itself. See Rebecca Tushnet, Stolen
Valor and Stolen Luxury, in THE LUXURY ECONOMY AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY: CRITICAL
REFLECTIONS 123 (Barton Beebe et al. eds., 2015).
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And it would be difficult to stop with these registration issues.  Priority
rules allowing various claimants to trump others’ uses even before beginning
their own uses, on the basis of foreign rights or “intent to use” filings with the
PTO, don’t rely on the prevention of confusion as their justification; even if
we treated the common law of trademark as a neutral baseline, such provi-
sions derogate from the common law.  Incontestability, a statutory provision
under which a registered mark that is unchallenged for five years can
become immune to challenge on the ground that it doesn’t in fact serve as a
source signifier, looks a lot like a way to suppress others’ truthful, non-decep-
tive speech,118 and the administrative convenience/quiet-title rationale for
incontestability seems fairly weak in a First Amendment framework.119  Rules
allowing trademark owners to change the quality or composition of their
goods without changing the associated trademark also seem to promote
deception, rather than to protect consumers.
Furthermore, if strict First Amendment scrutiny is the order of the day,
the causes of action for infringement of a registered mark, in section 32, and
infringement of an unregistered mark, in section 43(a), would also have to
be evaluated with a skeptical eye; they are equally content-based.120  One
court has already struck down an election-related rule barring political action
committees from using the name of a candidate without that candidate’s per-
mission.  Even assuming that the prevention of confusion is a compelling
interest, the court ruled, the existence of the untried, less restrictive alterna-
tive of allowing continued use plus a disclaimer of any affiliation meant that
the ban was not narrowly tailored.121  Not much separates that decision from
trademark law.
1. The Special Problem of Vagueness
The risks of First Amendment scrutiny should be particularly apparent
with respect to the argument that disparagement is unconstitutionally vague.
The Tam majority offered numerous examples of hard-to-distinguish results
118 Cf. P.R. Coffee Roasters LLC v. Pan Am. Grain Mfg. Co., No. 3:15–CV–02099, 2015
WL 8551102, at *10 (D.P.R. Dec. 11, 2015) (commenting that protection for merely
descriptive marks without secondary meaning would unconstitutionally suppress free
speech).
119 There’s a strong connection here with one original rationale for denying much con-
stitutional protection to commercial speech, which is the risk of diluting speech protection
generally.  The temptation could be to consider administrative convenience a substantial
enough governmental interest to uphold incontestability.  But if administrative conve-
nience is enough to constitute a substantial government interest here, why not for all sorts
of speech regulations directed at other harms, where administrative convenience may jus-
tify suppressing lots of non-harmful speech?
120 See Snow, supra note 6, at 104.  Also, there are special rules for “certification” and
collective marks; certification marks must not be used in a discriminatory fashion, exclud-
ing producers who meet the standards for certification adopted by the certifying organiza-
tion.  15 U.S.C. § 1064(5)(D) (2012).  How this rule could survive strict scrutiny is unclear.
121 Pursuing America’s Greatness v. Fed. Election Comm’n, No. 15-5264 (D.C. Cir. Aug.
2, 2016).
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rejecting or registering highly similar terms as disparaging or not.  And it’s
true that there are lots of inconsistencies in the results.  But vagueness is also
a huge problem with the rest of the bars, which can be equally unpredictable.
The PTO takes the position that the result in one case isn’t binding in the
next case, even if the facts are highly similar; that position isn’t limited to
section 2(a) disparagement cases.122  There is an individualized determina-
tion in each case, and the examples cited by the Tam majority often involved
different factual records about what members of the targeted group would
think when they saw the mark.123
If vagueness is a constitutional flaw in disparagement, then, most of the
other bars;124 or distinctions between inherently distinctive, immediately reg-
istrable marks versus descriptive marks that can only be registered upon a
showing of secondary meaning;125 or the “use as a mark” precedents requir-
ing trademark use instead of ornamental use for registration; or infringe-
ment standards themselves126 should also fall to a vagueness challenge.
122 See, e.g., In re Nett Designs, Inc., 236 F.3d 1339 (Fed. Cir. 2001); In re Couriaire
Express Int’l, Inc., 222 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 365, 366 (T.T.A.B. 1984) (“That each case must be
determined on its own facts is a proposition so well established that no authority need be
cited in support of it.”).
123 See In re Tam, 808 F.3d 1321, 1337 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (citing the PTO’s registration of
DYKES ON BIKES “after the applicant showed the term was often enough used with pride
among the relevant population”); see also McDermott v. S.F. Women’s Motorcycle Contin-
gent, 240 Fed. App’x 865, 866 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (recounting the initial refusal and subse-
quent successful registration after applicant submitted evidence that lesbians would not
perceive the mark as disparaging).
124 See Snow, supra note 6, at 156–58 (noting that other bars are also vague and
uncertain).
125 There is, for example, a circuit split on whether CHICKEN OF THE SEA for tuna is
inherently distinctive or descriptive. Compare Van Camp Sea Food Co. v. Packman Bros. 79
F.2d 511, 511–12 (3d Cir. 1935) (per curiam) (descriptive), with Van Camp Sea Food Co.
v. Alexander B. Stewart Orgs., 50 F.2d 976, 979 (C.C.P.A. 1931) (suggestive).  For further
discussion of the difficulty of marking the line between suggestive and descriptive, see also
Thompson Med. Co. v. Pfizer Inc., 753 F.2d 208, 213 (2d Cir. 1985) (“It cannot be gainsaid
that the judiciary is ill-equipped to distinguish between the descriptively suggestive and the
suggestively descriptive mark.  In addition, societal vicissitudes demand that the categories
retain fluidity to accommodate a particular mark’s evolving usage over time. . . . [I]t is
necessary to surmise the mental processes of those in the marketplace at whom the mark is
directed.” (footnote omitted)); AMF, Inc. v. Sleekcraft Boats, 599 F.2d 341, 349 (9th Cir.
1979) (“The line separating [suggestive and descriptive marks] is uncertain; extrapolating
the line from precedent would be impossible. . . . [T]he distinction between descriptive
and suggestive marks may be inarticulable . . . .”); Snow, supra note 6, at 153–55 (elaborat-
ing on the vagueness of the line); cf. Thompson Med. Co., 753 F.2d at 213 n.8 (“[B]ecause
generic marks cannot be protected even upon a showing of secondary meaning, courts
increasingly have been called upon to delineate the chimerical line between the descrip-
tive and the generic.”).
126 See, e.g., Graeme W. Austin, Trademarks and the Burdened Imagination, 69 BROOK. L.
REV. 827, 874 (2004) (“[T]he general uncertainty as to the sufficiency and type of confu-
sion required contributes to the general impression that trademark liability is founded on
an unsteady pile of vague standards.  Sometimes, courts deciding trademark infringement
cases do articulate applicable standards with apparent precision.  But the precision
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Consider refusals under section 2(d) based on likely confusion with a previ-
ously used mark: the PTO reversed a refusal to register BLACK BARK for
restaurant services, finding it unlikely to cause confusion with the registered
mark BLACK BARK BRISKET for meat and prepared meat.127  By contrast,
COLOMBIANO COFFEE HOUSE for restaurant services and COLUMBIAN
for coffee were closely related and therefore confusingly similar.128
As another example, the first stylized version of the word “lite” below is
registrable (with “lite” disclaimed, meaning that the trademark doesn’t pro-
vide any rights in the word itself) because the stylization is sufficient to create
a separate commercial impression; the second is not:
129 .130
When my students ask me for a rule distinguishing these two cases (and
others), I can only tell them that no system this large can be perfectly consis-
tent and that they need to train their judgment.  The PTO’s official position
is:
Whether or not the disclaimed literal components of a designation
sought to be registered are displayed in an inherently distinctive fashion is
necessarily a subjective matter which must be determined based on a
viewer’s first impression.
. . . .
achieved may sometimes be illusory, particularly since courts determine liability based
upon an holistic evaluation of the evidentiary ‘factors.’”); Robert G. Bone, Taking the Con-
fusion Out of “Likelihood of Confusion”: Toward a More Sensible Approach to Trademark Infringe-
ment, 106 NW. U. L. REV. 1307, 1335 (2012) (“[T]he [likely confusion] test’s genesis as an
ad hoc compromise without a guiding policy rationale contributes to its vague and open-
ended character. . . . And armed with a confusion-only infringement analysis and a vague
and open-ended test, judges have wide latitude to impose liability on questionable
grounds—such as anti-free riding—as long as they can find a plausible confusion risk.”).
127 In re DLMW-BBQ, LLC, 2016 BL 167592 (T.T.A.B. 2016).
128 In re Accelerate s.a.l., 101 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 2047, 2050–51 (T.T.A.B. 2012); see also,
e.g., In re Randakk’s Cycle Shakk, LLC, 2015 BL 142187, at *1–5 (T.T.A.B. 2015) (approv-
ing registration of RANDAKK’S CYCLE SHAKK for online retailing of motorcycle parts,
including electric motors, notwithstanding the preexisting mark RANDAX for “electronic
motors for land vehicles”); In re Columbia Ins. Co., 2015 BL 167330, *7 (T.T.A.B. 2015)
(refusing LYTNING for protective industrial boots in light of LIGHTNING GLOVES for
disposable latex gloves).
129 In re Miller Brewing Co., 226 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 666, 670 (T.T.A.B. 1985).
130 In re Pollio Dairy Prods. Corp., 8 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 2012, 2013–14 (T.T.A.B. 1988).
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Because of this, the fact that examining attorneys have considered the styliza-
tion of other, different marks to be sufficient to make those marks distinctive
is of limited probative value.131
Examples could easily be multiplied indefinitely because of the rule that
each registration is determined independent of past decisions.  Recently, the
Federal Circuit affirmed the PTO’s refusal to register a stylized version of
CHURRASCOS (grilled meat) for restaurant services:
The only hitch was that the applicant already had a registration for the
standard character form, CHURRASCOS, for the same services—that is, its
registered mark was broader and had fewer distinctive features than its
applied-for mark.132  Nonetheless, the court of appeals held, the PTO had
not erred.  Though a registered mark is presumed valid, that presumption
doesn’t carry over to a new mark, even one that “happens to be similar (or
even nearly identical).”133  No matter what the registration issue is, then, the
PTO maintains that each application is assessed on its own merits, including
the factual record developed by the examiner for that particular
application.134
The result is that the registration system is not highly predictable except
at the probabilistic level (we can predict the approximate percentage of
applications that will mature to registration), which is another way of saying
that the standards are vague enough that divergent outcomes are common.
There are now hundreds or thousands of applications each year.  It would be
actually astonishing if even the consistency available in obscenity cases were
achievable in this flood.  Asking the hundreds of examiners (at any given
time) for more than rough consistency in results would be like asking
America’s public school teachers to make their content-based assessments of
English papers with enough precision that they’d all give the same grades to
the same papers.
The inherent inconsistency in a merits-based system is one reason why
the Court has granted government flexibility in making content-based deci-
sions in analogous situations: many systems of government grants couldn’t
survive if required to be strictly consistent in every case, and the benefits of
having trademark registration (or public school teachers) are great enough
to justify the inevitable inconsistencies.  This is what it means to have a regu-
latory state, and it’s another reason why, if the state is going to maintain a
trademark system granting the benefits of registration after substantive exam-
131 In re Sadoru Grp., Ltd., 2012 WL 3875730, at *2, *6 (T.T.A.B. 2012) (citing In re
Grande Cheese Co., 2 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1447, 1449 (T.T.A.B. 1986)) (affirming refusal to
register stylized Japanese word for motorcycle seats and seat pads with word disclaimed).
132 In re Cordua Rests., Inc., 823 F.3d 594, 598 (Fed. Cir. 2016).
133 Id. at 600.
134 See, e.g., In re Boulevard Entm’t, Inc., 334 F.3d 1336, 1343 (Fed. Cir. 2003).
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ination, it needs flexibility and tolerance inconsistent with traditional strict
scrutiny or even heightened Central Hudson-style scrutiny.
2. Justifying Registration Requires Treating It as a Government Program,
Not as a Speech Ban
Several decades ago, Lilian BeVier argued that trademark infringement
liability was desirable, while general bans on false advertising weren’t,
because consumers can’t protect themselves against trademark confusion the
way they can protect themselves against other forms of deception.135  Unfor-
tunately for free speech absolutists who also like trademark law, that’s
implausible in many cases.136  Consumers can use the place of purchase,
small details, vendor reputation, the presence of a guarantee, and numerous
other indicia to identify counterfeits, and in the absence of counterfeiting
there are usually many more signifiers of actual source.  Expansive trademark
doctrines extend trademark liability far past common-law fraud, for example
to cover “initial interest confusion” in which consumers are only briefly con-
fused and know the truth when they make their purchases.137  It’s hard to
imagine how strict scrutiny could preserve the non-fraud-like elements of cur-
rent trademark law.
Central Hudson-style intermediate scrutiny might leave the Lanham Act
with fewer holes.  Still, the government’s ability to go after particular decep-
tive uses of marks directly through consumer protection law, rather than
denying registration before any harm has actually been shown or requiring
disclaimers, might make most of section 2 overbroad even under Central Hud-
son’s supposedly laxer scrutiny.  The current registration system targets possi-
ble or potential deception, not actual deception.  The same is true with
infringement liability.
V. OBJECTIONS TO ALLOWING THE GOVERNMENT BROAD FREEDOM
TO DEFINE REGISTRABILITY
A. Viewpoint Discrimination
One objection: If my reasoning is correct, then could Congress deny
trademarks to Democrats?  What about any trademarks that incorporated the
Democratic donkey and red, white, and blue?  Viewpoint discrimination can
be illegitimate in many more instances than content discrimination—that a
disparagement bar is constitutional doesn’t license Congress to grant trade-
marks only to Republicans.138
135 Lillian R. BeVier, Competitor Suits for False Advertising Under Section 43(a) of the Lanham
Act: A Puzzle in the Law of Deception, 78 VA. L. REV. 1, 20–21 (1992).
136 See Roger E. Schechter, Additional Pieces of the Deception Puzzle: Some Reactions to Profes-
sor BeVier, 78 VA. L. REV. 57, 66–67 (1992).
137 See Grotrian, Helfferich, Schulz, Th. Steinweg Nachf. v. Steinway & Sons, 523 F.2d
1331, 1342 (2d Cir. 1975).
138 R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 388–389 (1992), indicates that governments
can’t decide that assaults against Republicans because they are Republicans will be subject
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The existing exclusions in section 2 should be understood as content-
based rather than viewpoint-based.  Contrary to the holding of In re Tam,139
the ban on disparaging marks should be characterized as content-based—a
registered mark can’t disparage anyone, abortionist or anti-choice zealot.140
The Federal Circuit en banc majority claimed that “[t]he legal significance of
viewpoint discrimination is the same whether the government disapproves of
the message or claims that some part of the populace will disapprove of the
message.”141  But this framing cleverly equivocates on “some part of the pop-
ulace”—that statement would be plausible if the “part of the populace” at
issue was static and unchanging no matter what mark was at issue.  However,
if the “part of the populace” whose views are considered changes depending
on the specifics of the applied-for mark, no particular group or set of view-
points receives protection denied to everyone else.
Congress didn’t disagree with any particular message or attempt to avoid
disparagement of any particular target.142  Like defamation, which is content-
based but not viewpoint-based, the disparagement bar protects everyone.  In
other words, falsely and in bad faith praising someone, with resulting unwar-
ranted gain to his reputation, is not actionable, while falsely and in bad faith
denigrating someone, with resulting unwarranted harm to his reputation, is
defamatory.  While the content of speech is very much relevant, the only
“viewpoint” being consistently suppressed is the viewpoint that defamation is
a perfectly fine thing.
to harsher punishment, or that only false advertising that degrades men will be banned.
Cf. Sunstein, supra note 54, at 611 (arguing that government funding choices on aesthetic,
qualitative, and content-based grounds are all acceptable and distinguishable from view-
point-based discrimination).
139 808 F.3d 1321, 1335–37 (Fed. Cir. 2015).  To elaborate further: if, in context, the
term “slants” connotes meaning related to window-shades, or “redskins” connotes peanuts,
then the PTO will register marks containing those terms.  Whenever a substantial compo-
nent of the referenced group would perceive that a term they consider derogatory as
applied to them is being applied to them, however, then registration will be refused,
regardless of the applicant’s viewpoint.  This is a distinction based on content—people
referring to peanuts can register the term—but not on viewpoint.  The applicant’s speech
or viewpoint isn’t part of the evaluation; instead, it’s the overall meaning of the term at
issue, in the context of its surroundings.
140 See Ridley v. Mass. Bay Transp. Auth., 390 F.3d 65, 82–87 (1st Cir. 2004) (consider-
ing a ban on disparaging subway ads).  Sunstein considers similar restrictions on hate
speech in government arts funding to be viewpoint-based, but nonetheless acceptable
given the effects of government support.  Sunstein, supra note 54, at 614–15 (“[Hate
speech] is not merely offensive, but also helps produce a distinctive set of harms, including
a perpetuation of second-class citizenship for certain groups.  Government[s] might have
sufficient reason to refuse to fund such speech even if [they] may not criminalize it.”).
141 Tam, 808 F.3d at 1336.
142 See id. at 1372 (Dyk, J., concurring and dissenting) (“[T]he standard is not based on
the government’s disagreement with anything.  Rather, it is based on an objective, ‘neutral’
assessment of a non-government perspective—in this case, a ‘substantial composite of the
referenced group.’ . . . [T]here is no ‘realistic possibility that official suppression of ideas is
afoot.’” (quoting Davenport v. Wash. Educ. Ass’n., 551 U.S. 177, 189 (2007))).
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The Supreme Court has held that a law barring only “fighting words”
based on race and religion discriminates on the basis of viewpoint because
other types of fighting words are allowed, including those based on political
affiliation or homosexuality; the Court concluded that the government can’t
allow one side of an argument to “fight freestyle” while the other is con-
strained.143  By contrast, disparagement based on membership in any group
is covered by section 2(a).  In the world of trademark registration, no one is
licensed to fight freestyle; consistent with the doux-commerce rationale, we
are all “to follow Marquis of Queensbury rules” in our registered
trademarks.144
Furthermore, the disparagement exclusion denies registrations both to
people trying to disparage a group and people trying to reclaim terms on
behalf of the disparaged group.145  If a substantial composite of the group
described would find the term disparaging, registration is barred.  Thus, the
disparagement bar is also neutral as to the applicant’s viewpoint on the par-
ticular disparaged group at issue146—whereas viewpoint discrimination in
the past has been tied to the viewpoint of the person who is losing out
because of her speech, such as a speaker denied school funding because her
viewpoint was religious instead of nonreligious.147  So, for example, if an
applicant applied for CELEBRASIANS for an advocacy group that sought to
143 R.A.V., 505 U.S. at 391 (noting that the ordinance in R.A.V. targeted only specific
kinds of “abusive invective,” excluding others, including those based on political affiliation
or homosexuality); id. at 392 (government can’t allow one side to “fight freestyle” while the
other is constrained).  Jack Balkin, in conversation, offered the example of HAPPY JEW for
bagels (probably registrable) versus SMELLY JEW for bagels (unregistrable), to argue that
section 2(a) is viewpoint-based.  But neither Jew nor Gentile can register this term, nor can
anyone register SMELLY GENTILE.  Moreover, as Balkin suggested, to the extent that the
section 2(a) bar furthers Congress’s general purpose of making commerce orderly and
open to all, disparaging terms can be singled out even under R.A.V. because their special
treatment is an instance of the overall justification for the registration system.  I thank Jack
Balkin for pressing me on this point.
144 R.A.V., 505 U.S. at 391.
145 See id. (explaining that a hypothetical statute that prohibited “odious racial epi-
thets . . . to proponents of all views” would not discriminate on the basis of viewpoint);
Jacobs, supra note 68, at 1424 (noting that many denials of disparaging vanity license plates
come from people of the targeted heritage seeking to reclaim terms; “the recall of a single
term can affect multiple points of view”).
146 See Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312, 315–19 (1988) (plurality) (upholding law against
display of any sign within 500 feet of a foreign embassy if the sign would tend to bring that
foreign government into “public odium” or “disrepute”; restriction was not viewpoint-
based because looking at policies of foreign governments was a neutral method of identify-
ing covered speech); see also Ridley v. Mass. Bay Transp. Auth., 390 F.3d 65, 90 (1st Cir.
2004) (“[G]uidelines prohibiting demeaning or disparaging ads are themselves viewpoint
neutral.”); id. at 91 (“[T]he state is not attempting to give one group an advantage over
another in the marketplace of ideas.”); cf. Ark. Educ. Television Comm’n v. Forbes, 523
U.S. 666, 683 (1998) (denying participation in political debate to candidate with minimal
public support was not viewpoint-based, because participation would be denied to anyone
who lacked sufficient support, no matter what views he held).
147 See Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 831 (1995).
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bar Asian immigration, the mark wouldn’t be disparaging even if the group
was.
The In re Tam majority’s error was to find viewpoint discrimination
because the bar relies on figuring out what a group of people understands
the meaning of a term to be, in context.  That’s not a regulation that is based
on the viewpoint of the speaker.  Simon Tam insists that he’s reclaiming the
term “slants”; the Washington team insists that it respects and celebrates
Native Americans.148  We don’t have to question their sincerity or make any
inquiry into what they actually think to apply the disparagement bar.  More-
over, the error of conflating the speaker’s viewpoint with the audience’s
understanding, if taken seriously, would indicate that the deceptiveness bar is
also viewpoint-based.149  Terms that convey materially false meanings about a
good or service are unregistrable (regardless of whether intent to deceive is
present), but descriptive terms that convey immaterial false meanings are
registrable with secondary meaning.  It’s materiality—a subjective, observer-
based inquiry—that makes the difference, just as the perception of the target
group makes the difference for disparagement.
Another way to see the disparagement bar is as working together with
the false connection bar.  Taken together, the bars create a viewpoint-neutral
ban on use of the identity of a person or group of which one is not a part.  If
a mark disparages, it probably doesn’t cause a false connection; if it causes a
false connection, it probably doesn’t disparage, and together they make up a
unified content-based prohibition.150  For example, DONALD TRUMP
should not be registrable for pin˜atas without Trump’s consent, regardless of
whether one views the juxtaposition of the mark with the goods as disparag-
ing or approving.  Such a view is consistent with the legislative history, in
which disparagement was initially touted as a way to avoid false connec-
tions.151  Tam, unlike most applicants for disparaging marks, is a member of
148 The use of a disparaging term as a mark might be thought to express the viewpoint
“this is an okay thing to say,” but at that point viewpoint and content have united in an
unhelpful way; it’s equally true to claim that using a deceptive mark expresses the view-
point “this deceptive term is okay to use.”
149 See Snow, supra note 6, at 145.
150 See Bos. Red Sox Baseball Club Ltd. v. Sherman, 88 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1581
(T.T.A.B. 2008) (finding that SEX ROD in Red Sox font was scandalous and disparaging of
the Red Sox, but not likely to cause confusion or section 2(a) false connection for the very
reason that it was disparaging); id. at 1591, 1593 (“The fact that . . . applicant’s mark may
evoke or bring to mind opposer’s mark does not in itself necessarily compel a finding of
likelihood of confusion as to source . . . . the public would not . . . believe that opposer, a
famous and reputable organization, would be associated with a mark that disparages
itself.”).
151 In congressional hearings, lawyer Edward Rogers—also the primary drafter of the
Lanham Act—condemned sellers who obtained “vicarious credit to goods by putting a
great man’s name on them,” and suggested barring marks that “bring [someone] into
disrepute or ridicule [by] anyone in the place or community he resides.” Trade-Marks:
Hearings on H.R. 9041 Before the Subcomm. on Trade-Marks of the H. Comm. on Patents, 75th
Cong. 80–81 (1938).  Later testimony suggested that the disparagement and scandalous-
ness bars would allow the PTO to refuse, for example, ABRAHAM LINCOLN gin—a classic
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the group he targets—but perfect individual fit isn’t necessary if the overall
law is viewpoint neutral.
Admittedly, the line between content- and viewpoint-based regulation is
controversial and not very helpful without a theory of what the particular rule
at issue is for.152  But that problem returns us to the government’s legitimate
purposes in running a registration scheme.153
false connection. Trade-Marks: Hearings on H.R. 4744 Before the Subcomm. on Trade-Marks of
the H. Comm. on Patents, 76th Cong. 19–20 (1939).  Still later, the bill was amended to insert
the additional prohibition against “falsely suggest[ing] a connection with,” immediately
following the ban on disparagement. H. JOURNAL, 77th Cong., 2d Sess. 542 (1942); see also
Trade-Marks: Hearings on H.R. 4744 Before the Subcomm. on Trade-Marks of the H. Comm. on
Patents, 76th Cong. 21 (1939), reprinted in Univ. of Notre Dame du Lac v. J.C. Gourmet
Food Imps. Co., 703 F.2d 1372, 1381 (Fed. Cir. 1983) (including the statement of Thomas
E. Robertson, former Commissioner of Patents, which suggested that the disparagement
bar needed to be broadened because “it does not cover the use of an ex-President’s
name . . . in a respectful manner on goods on which the family might not desire it used”).
152 See, e.g., Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 831 (noting that the distinction between content
and viewpoint discrimination “is not a precise one”); Berman, supra note 54, at 83 (“That it
is unconstitutional for the government to act for the purpose of promoting speech favor-
ing the Democrats (as opposed to, say, the Republicans) does not necessarily entail that it
is unconstitutional for it to act . . . for the purpose of promoting speech favoring democ-
racy (as opposed to, say, totalitarianism).  Whether the latter is likewise unconstitutional
depends, to be sure, upon one’s interpretation of the substantive content of the First
Amendment, in particular ‘on what sorts of motivations it allows government to have.’”
(footnotes omitted) (quoting GEOFFREY R. STONE ET AL., CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1765 (3d
ed. 1996))); Jacobs, supra note 68, at 1363–64 (2001) (discussing the need to understand
viewpoint discrimination contextually, depending on the purpose of the government pro-
gram at issue).
153 One possible response to my argument is that, if the justification for the disparage-
ment is the desire to avoid connecting the government with the registration of a disparag-
ing or scandalous term, then the rule should be that we assess the contested term’s
meaning today.  Instead, the PTO will only refuse to register or cancel a term that was
disparaging or scandalous at the time of the application.  Thus, the government will accept
a mark that becomes disparaging despite being neutral at the time it was adopted, and
can’t completely divorce itself from the endorsement it wishes to resist.  Amos ‘n Andy
might be an example: while the name is not disparaging in the abstract, the racist content
of the Amos ‘n Andy shtick might have taught the public to associate the term with perni-
cious stereotypes about African-Americans over time.  The full name of the NAACP, the
National Association for the Advancement of Colored People, is a name that could be
scandalous if adopted today, for different reasons.
A current meaning standard, however, would create real problems for my constitu-
tional analysis, because there could be untrademarkable goods and services.  Suppose the
Ku Klux Klan rebranded itself as the Garden Auxiliary; once it became known that the
Garden Auxiliary was the KKK, it too would be a term of odium.  Perhaps the best answer is
that the existence of a group, product, or service can’t itself be scandalous or disparaging
in the relevant sense.  Only a trademark can be scandalous or disparaging in the way it
evokes some concept (or group) that is not itself the product or service, but is instead a
commercialized use of a term that should not be commercialized.  The PTO will issue
registrations for sex toys and other products that are not matters for polite conversation in
all audiences, as long as the products are legal.
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B. Analogies to Copyright or Regulation of Creative Works
On the same theory of withdrawing support, could the government
refuse to grant copyright to disparaging works or obscenity?  Upholding the
disparagement bar would not entail this consequence because of the differ-
ence between what is protected in copyright and trademark.  Copyright pro-
tects the expression in a work; to mandate that the work be non-disparaging
or nonobscene to get protection is to mandate a change in the work itself as a
condition of the benefits of protection.154  But because trademark is about
protecting a source link rather than a work in itself, the Washington team
can have the unregistrable word present on everything that is protected by its
rights in the team colors and logo.  That is, the business can continue to use
the symbol the government doesn’t like on the very products and services for
which it seeks trademark protection and still have its trade interests protected
as long as it chooses some other symbol to make the link between itself and
its goods and services.
It is worth noting, however, that the government could indeed withdraw
or refuse to grant copyright protection to categories of works without violat-
ing the First Amendment.  Architectural works, for example, were excluded
from copyright protection for two centuries with no First Amendment
problems.  Consider also the lack of copyright protection for fashion design,
or for recipes and perfumes.  Professor Christopher Buccafusco has cogently
argued that tastes and smells often produce sensory experiences that are the
equivalent of visual and aural art,155 rendering current copyrightability rules
content-based.  Again, then, the question is whether the exclusions are suffi-
ciently related to a legitimate purpose for the government’s program, and
this legitimate purpose may even come from the categories of creative activity
the government wishes to encourage.
The trademark function also distinguishes registration from New York’s
unconstitutional “Son of Sam” law, which allowed the state to escrow money
received from a criminal’s expression about his crimes.156  Even assuming
there is a constitutional right to profit from one’s expression, Washington’s
team can continue to sell the same jerseys without financial sanction, and
with trademark protection, and the government will not escrow the resulting
154 We do mandate that the work be expressive (as well as conceptually separable from
the useful aspects of an object in the case of pictorial, graphic, and sculptural works) and
not purely factual, so we do already make some content-based judgments in copyright.
155 See Christopher Buccafusco, Making Sense of Intellectual Property Law, 97 CORNELL L.
REV. 501, 540–41 (2012).
156 Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. Members of the N.Y. State Crime Victims Bd., 502 U.S.
105, 108 (1991).  The Court determined that the “Son of Sam” law was a content-based
statute because it “single[d] out income derived from expressive activity for a burden the
State place[d] on no other income, and it [wa]s directed only at works with a specified
content.” Id. at 116; see also Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 828 (“[G]overnment offends the First
Amendment when it imposes financial burdens on certain speakers based on the content
of their expression.” (citing Simon & Schuster, Inc., 502 U.S. at 115)).
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income nor tax the sales any differently than it does for other NFL teams’
jerseys.157
VI. TRADEMARK LAW AS FIRST AMENDMENT MICROCOSM
Trademark law presently is host only to a small outpost of free speech
doctrine, but that situation seems poised to change.  And trademark law
might provide a good opportunity to rethink the recent judicial assault on
ordinary economic regulations carried out by way of regulating commercial
speech.
Consider the simplest case for government intervention, deceptive
marks.  Deception involves an interaction between the mark and the identi-
fied product or service itself, which presumably in the abstract is unprotected
by the First Amendment.  SUPER SILK for fabric not made of silk is decep-
tive and never registrable or protectable.  SUPER SILK for materials made of
silk is merely descriptive, and registrable and protectable upon a showing of
secondary meaning.  REDSKINS for potatoes is the same.  The restrictions
here are not speaker-based in the ordinary sense but producer-based, which
might be a good way to think about commercial speech generally.  Assessing
the relation between the product and the symbol is a necessary part of any
functioning trademark system.  And that’s not a bad thing, even as current
Supreme Court doctrine seems to condemn “content-based” regulation
wholesale.
Current First Amendment categories don’t work well with trademarks
for several interrelated reasons.  First, there are often at least two speakers’
interests at stake—the claimant and the defendant or opposer, as Judge
Dyk’s In re Tam opinion pointed out.  Second, trademark is a system of eco-
nomic regulation, where the economic transactions are facilitated through
speech that is regularly non-falsifiable, or only true or false to the extent that
the law protects a claimant’s rights.  Third, registration and infringement are
closely related but distinct inquiries, and a right to use a symbol isn’t necessa-
rily a right to register it.  Registration, as its name indicates, is a creature of
the regulatory state; applying libertarian First Amendment doctrines to it
leaves us with nowhere to stand as a baseline.  The corrosive First Amend-
ment that emerges from Reed can’t even conceptualize registration as a
coherent government project.
Because of all these features, trademark is a useful testing ground for the
idea that regulations of false and misleading commercial speech will some-
how survive strict scrutiny, and therefore we can have our cake (a libertarian
First Amendment) and eat it safely and with confidence that it is in fact cake,
too (robust regulation of commercial activity).  As the previous Parts have
shown, such a claim is premised on the mistaken assumption that false and
misleading speech will be easy to identify.  It is not.  Section 2(a)’s current
157 See Pro-Football, Inc. v. Blackhorse, 112 F. Supp. 3d 439, 456 (E.D. Va. 2015) (“Sec-
tion 2(a) imposes no financial penalty on speech—it simply cancels a trademark’s registra-
tion; the speech itself is uninhibited.”).
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troubles are related to those of the FDA, whose control over promotion of
off-label uses of medications has recently been successfully challenged as a
violation of the First Amendment.158  Other ordinary commercial speech
regulations, such as the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, are no safer.  That
law extensively regulates how debt collectors may communicate with debtors
and others.  Congress specifically prohibited the use of threats (traditionally
unprotected speech), profane language (not traditionally unprotected), and
threats to publicize the existence of the debt (likewise).159  Debt collectors
are also not allowed to publicize the existence of the debt even in the
absence of threats to do so—a content-based restriction on speech to non-
debtors, or possibly even a viewpoint-based restriction, given that speech
about how a person pays her bills on time is unregulated.160  These are the
kinds of regulations that are currently protected by commercial speech doc-
trine; its demise would profoundly disrupt the modern regulatory state.
More generally, once an economic regulation is exposed to the modern
First Amendment, that regulation may have difficulty surviving, no matter
how sensible it is.  This is either a problem with First Amendment doctrine,
or it’s a problem with the modern rejection of Lochner.  I believe it’s the for-
mer.  Much commercial activity involves and even requires speech to occur.
The basic idea behind strict scrutiny for content- or viewpoint-based regula-
tion was to protect against unfair government suppression of speakers, who
might have important information to share with audiences as well as auton-
omy interests of their own in speaking.  But if we are really that suspicious of
government economic regulation picking winners and losers by way of
speech, then we shouldn’t even have trademark registration, and maybe not
even infringement cases.
My preferred response would instead be to rethink First Amendment
doctrine as applied to ordinary economic regulations.  Whether sec-
tion 2(a)’s ban on disparaging marks survives constitutional scrutiny is only a
small part of that broader issue.  In particular, having a trademark registra-
tion system (and trademark law in general) means that the government
spends substantial resources making content-based distinctions among differ-
ent claimed marks.  That’s not a strike against trademark law; it’s a conse-
quence of the fact that content-based distinctions are part of a well-
functioning system of regulating commercial transactions.  The government
can validly reject a trademark application because the claimed mark is actu-
ally a generic term for the product—such as COMPUTER for computers—or
because the claimed mark is confusingly similar to another producer’s—such
as GOOGLE for computer chips, claimed by some entity other than
Alphabet.  Content discrimination forms the basis of the trademark system.
The only question is what kinds of content-based distinctions are legitimate.
158 See Amarin Pharma, Inc. v. U.S. Food & Drug Admin., 119 F. Supp. 3d 196, 237
(S.D.N.Y. 2015).
159 15 U.S.C. §§ 1692d, 1692f (2012).
160 Id. § 1692c(b).
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I would leave most such determinations for the legislature, for better or
worse.161
There is one other alternative.  Nothing requires actual doctrine to be
coherent, consistent, or equally suspicious of different types of regulations.
There remains the possibility of continued ad hoc-ism, where the Court
applies its strict scrutiny only to some parts of a system, often the ones that
protect less politically powerful groups.  But that would be the worst result of
all.
161 Cf. United States v. Am. Library Ass’n, 539 U.S. 194, 205 (2003) (plurality opinion)
(noting that public libraries “necessarily consider content in making collection decisions
and enjoy broad discretion in making them”); Ark. Educ. Television Comm’n v. Forbes,
523 U.S. 666, 673 (1998) (holding that public television broadcasters necessarily exercise
editorial discretion).
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